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The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial
Decree Ordering Institutional Change"
Recent lawsuits asking federal courts to mandate large scale institu-
tional change have drawn into question the traditional role of a court
in litigation. This role usually terminated with a judicial decree of
rights between the parties, and an order directing the parties to per-
form certain acts. The actual performance of those acts has customarily
taken place without the participation of the court. However, in several
recent cases mandating institutional change-particularly in prisons
and mental hospitals-federal courts have assumed a more active role
in the implementation of their orders to assure that their decrees be-
come more than paper pronouncements.
This Note focuses on one recent case in which the court became in-
volved in the implementation of the institutional changes it had
decreed. In Wyatt v. Stickney' United States District Judge Frank M.
Johnson, Jr., of the Middle District of Alabama ruled that mentally
impaired persons confined in Alabama state hospitals were being
denied a constitutional "right to treatment,"2 and ordered a range of
* The research for this Note was funded in part by the Mental Health Law Project
which is affiliated with the Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C. The
Center represented several national mental health organizations as amici in the litigation
discussed in this Note. The views expressed in this Note are those of the authors, not of
the Project or the Center.
1. 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334
F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afI'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit opinion
affirmed the district court's holding that the Constitution guarantees a right to treatment
to civilly committed mental patients, that the suit was not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, that the right to treatment could be implemented through judicially manageable
standards, and that the granting of relief did not invade a province of decision making
reserved to the legislature. Id. at 1312-16. Stating that the issue was premature, the Fifth
Circuit reserved decision on whether the district court could alter the state budget or
take other steps to finance the right to treatment should the state fail to take appro-
priate action. Id. at 1318. A decision on the award of attorneys' fees was also reserved so
that the issue could be decided with other pending cases. Id. at 1319.
2. The district court and the Fifth Circuit both found that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees mental patients a "right to receive such in-
dividual treatment as will give each of them a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to
improve his or her mental condition," 325 F. Supp. at 784, and a right to "such individual
habilitation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a more useful and
meaningful life and to ieturn to society." 344 F. Supp. at 390. The Fifth Circuit's af-
firmance of Wyatt relied primarily on its earlier decision in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974), which it summarized as follows:
In Donaldson, we held that civilly committed mental patients have a constitutional
right to such individual treatment as will help each of them to be cured or to improve
his or her mental condition. We reasoned that the only permissible justifications for
civil commitment, and for the massive abridgements of constitutionally protected
liberties it entails, were the danger posed by the individual committed to himself
or to others, or the individual's need for treatment and care. We held that where
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institutional changes in three state mental hospitals. For each institu-
tion, he appointed a Human Rights Committee3 to oversee the imple-
mentation of the changes and to act as the "eyes and ears" of the court
to protect the constitutional rights of the institution's residents.4
While the "right to treatment" doctrine and its development in
Wyatt have been the subjects of extensive comment,5 the implementa-
tion process has been largely ignored in the literature. Wyatt provides
a useful case study for examining the mechanisms available to courts
to achieve the implementation of judicial decrees ordering institu-
tional changes, and the role a court can assume in the implementation
process. To detail the implementation process in Wyatt, this Note will
draw on interviews with persons on all sides of the litigation,, the
the justification for commitment was treatment, it offended the fundamentals of
due process if treatment were not in fact provided; and we held that where the
justification was the danger to self or to others, then treatment had to be provided
as the quid pro quo society had to pay as the price of the extra safety it derived from
the denial of individuals' liberty.
503 F.2d at 1312. For a list of some of the extensive literature on the "right to treat-
ment" see note 5 infra.
3. 344 F. Supp. at 378, 386; 344 F. Supp. at 392, 407.
4. For a discussion of other cases involving similar implementation devices, see pp.
1344-46 infra.
5. See, e.g., Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 Am. CRIM.
L. REv. 587 (1972) (co-counsel for plaintiffs discusses the early stages of the lawsuit con-
cerning Bryce Hospital); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1337-42 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Civil Com-
mitment] (discusses the formulation of the decree and implementation); Note, Implement-
ing the Right to Treatment for Involuntarily Confined Mental Patients: Wyatt v. Stickney,
3 N.M.L. REV. 338 (1973) (discusses possible sanctions to enforce the right to treatment);
Commentary, A State Mental Institution is Constitutionally Required to Provide Adequate
Medical Treatment for Patients Involuntarily Committed, 23 ALA. L. REV. 642 (1971)
(discusses the early stages of the case); Case Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of
Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Wyatt Case Comment] (discusses the issuance of the decree).
For discussion of the "right to treatment," see, e.g., Birnbaum, The Right to Treat-
ment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Rothman, Decarcerating Prisoners and Mental Patients, I
Civ. LI. REV. 8 (1973); Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The
Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARv. Civ. Rns-rs-Civ. LIB. L. REV.
513 (1973); Symposium, Observations on the Right to Treatment, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 553
(1972); Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969); Symposium, The
Mentally Ill and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 742 (1969); Developments-
Civil Commitment, supra, at 1316-57; Note, The Rights of the Mentally Ill During In-
carceration: The Developing Law, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 494 (1973); Note, The Nascent Right
to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
6. Interviewed were:
Attorneys: George W. Dean, counsel for plaintiffs, Montgomery, Ala., Aug. 29, 1974;
Ira DeMent, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama, in Montgomery, Ala.,
Aug. 19, 1974; Jack Drake, co-counsel for plaintiffs, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 22,
1974; Charles Halpern, counsel for several national mental health organizations as
amici curiae, in Washington, D.C., May 17, 1974 (Center for Law and Social Policy);
Bob Humphries, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, in Montgomery, Ala., Aug.
19, 1974; Kenneth Vines, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama,
in Montgomery, Ala., Aug. 20, 1974. Defendants, Administrators and Staff: Peter
Blouke, former Superintendent of Partlow State School and Hospital, in Tuscaloosa,
Ala., Aug. 22, 1974; Richard E. Buckley, then Superintendent of Partlow State
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official legal papers filed with the court by all parties, official progress
reports, 8 and informal letters and memoranda.
1. The Emerging Importance of Implementation
The judiciary has generally limited the scope of its judgments in
order to avoid extensive involvement in implementing large scale in-
stitutional change. This was a result of the principle that "a court of
equity will not issue an unenforceable decree of injunction," and of
the assumption that only limited techniques of enforcement, such as
contempt, were available to the court.
Because the only injunctions which could apparently be enforced
by contempt were preventive injunctions, which prohibit or compel
the performance of discrete, easily defined acts, 10 those were the only
injunctions issued." The problem of implementation rarely arose.
School and Hospital, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 21, 26, 1974; Rev. Lou Scales, Chaplain
of Partlow State School and Hospital, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 28, 1974; Stonewall
B. Stickney, M.D., former Commissioner of Mental Health Board of Alabama, in
Montgomery, Ala., Aug. 20, 1974. Bryce Hunan Rights Conmittee Members: Bert
Bank, Chairperson, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 26, 1974; Babs Heilpern, in Mont-
gomery, Ala., Aug. 20, 1974 (telephone); Alberta Murphy, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug.
27, 1974; John T. Wagnon, in Montgomery, Ala., Aug. 19, 1974. Partlow Human
Rights Committee Members: Harriet Tillman, Chairperson, in Birmingham, Ala.,
Aug. 24, 1974; Marvin B. Dinsmore, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 22, 1974; Rev. Robert
Keever, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 22, 1974; Andrew Lorincz, M.D., in Birmingham,
Ala., Aug. 24. 25, 1974; John Mathews, in Montgomery, Ala., Aug. 18, 1974; Rev.
James Pernell, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 28, 1974; James "Sunshine" Smith, in
Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 22, 1974. Others: Alfred Baumeister, professor of psychology,
University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 26, 1974; Norman Ellis, professor
of psychology, University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 26, 1974; Ray Fowler,
Chairperson of University of Alabama Psychology Department, in Tuscaloosa, Ala.,
Aug. 22, 1974; Harold Martin, Editor and Publisher of the Montgomery Advertiser-
Journal, in Montgomery, Ala., Aug. 20, 1974.
[Interviews are hereinafter cited by the name of the person interviewed.]
7. The legal papers filed with the court by all parties were made available by the
Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C. See note 49 infra. Unless otherwise
indicated, all legal papers cited are from Wyatt v. Stichney (district court docket on file
with Yale Law Journal).
8. Progress reports filed with the district court are cited according to the titles which
appear on the reports. Reports of regular bi-weekly meetings of the Partlow Human
Rights Committee are cited as PHRC Report.
9. Hearne v. Smylie, 225 F. Supp. 645, 655 (D. Idaho), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 563
(1964); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1012 (1965).
10. The phrase "preventive injunctions" is adopted from 0. FIss, INJUNrICONs 1 (1972).
Fiss distinguishes among three types of injunctions-preventive, regulatory, and structural.
A "regulatory" injunction, in Fiss's formulation, is one "where the court puts a general
prohibition in an injunction and attempts to use the injunction to regulate a party's
behavior over a long period of time," while a "structural injunction" is one "where the
court attempts to use the injunction as a device for altering or reorganizing some institu-
tional arrangement." Id. The distinction between "preventive" and "structural" injunc-
tions is used in this Note, but the separate category of "regulatory" injunctions is not.
While the difference between preventive and structural injunctions is based on the sub-
stantive goal of the injunction, the distinction between these two types and regulatory
injunctions is based on the duration of the injunction. "Regulatory" injunctions can
therefore be divided entirely into the other two categories.
11. The question of whether the court can fashion adequate relief is one of the three
aspects of the traditional concept of "justiciability"-together with whether judicially
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This practice had a particularly harsh application in suits dealing
with conditions in prisons and mental hospitals-"total" or "closed
institutions,"'1  the characteristics of which made preventive injunc-
tions13 or monetary damages14 inadequate to remedy unconstitutional
conditions.'3 Several characteristics of these institutions deserve men-
tion. First, because the institutions are total, they
discoverable and manageable standards exist by which the court can measure the rights
and obligations of the parties, and whether judicial resolution of the controversy would
be an improper assumption of a task more appropriately done by the executive or the
legislature. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 198, 217, 236 (1961); Wyatt Case Comment, supra note 5, at 1296. While this Note
focuses specifically on implementation, each of the other aspects of justiciability also bears
on the issue of whether effective relief can be given. Manageable standards are necessary
not only to pronounce the parties' rights and to formulate a judicial decree, but also to
determine whether the decree is being obeyed, an essential part of implementation. Due
respect for the executive and legislature (and also comity between the federal and state
governments) is not simply an abstract concept which propriety dictates the court should
follow, but rather is an intensely practical aspect of implementation. If agencies of the
state executive branch, as defendants in a suit, believe that the court has disregarded
principles of either the separation of powers or federal-state relations, the court's ability
to effectuate adequate relief will be diminished greatly. See note 15 infra.
12. See E. GOFFMAN, AsYLUMs: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS
AND OTHER INMATES 4-5 (1961):
Every institution captures something of the time and interest of its members and
provides something of a world for them; in brief, every institution has encompassing
tendencies. When we review the different institutions in our Western society, we
find some that are encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones
next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to
social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the
physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests, or
moors. These establishments I am calling total institutions ....
Goffman lists five types of "total institutions": those which care for persons who are both
incapable and harmless, such as homes for the aged; those which care for persons who
are incapable and unintentionally harmful, such as mental hospitals; those used to con-
fine persons who are intentionally dangerous, such as prisons; those established to further
the performance of some task, such as army barracks; and those designed as retreats from
the world, such as monasteries. Id. See generally D. Bazelon, Law and the Future of the
Closed Institution (unpublished paper delivered at Yale Law School Sesquicentennial
Convocation, Nov. 1, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (referring to prisons and
mental hospitals as "closed institutions").
13. Preventive injunctions have been issued to redress specific deprivations of con-
stitutional rights in prisons. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974) (mail
censorship).
14. Monetary damages have been awarded to individuals to redress injuries suffered in
closed institutions. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
171 (1974); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968). But it is
speculative whether such a remedy will have any effect in improving conditions in the
institution. Monetary awards are also of little, if any, value to discharged residents, who
may be unable to undo the harm caused by the improper conditions of their confinement.
15. In addition to the ineffectiveness of preventive injunctions, courts also hesitated
to enter this area because the institutions are run by the executive branch of the govern-
ment, and because any court orders which require the expenditure of additional funds
arguably invade the province of the legislature. However, neither of these considerations
has proved to be an obstacle. Courts are no longer reluctant to review the constitution-
ality of executive action or to issue orders which indirectly require the expenditure of
state funds to bring the state into compliance with constitutional standards. This
principle has become so widely accepted that in Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 59
(E.D. Tex. 1974), Judge Justice dismissed as "frivolous" a contention that an order to
remedy unconstitutional conditions in correctional facilities for youths contravened the
Eleventh Amendment and the separation of powers doctrine. See generally Edelman v.
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can readily alter the terms of a patient's confinement. A patient
who is kept in custodial confinement may be shifted to a different
unit during the pendency of a hearing, granted a conditional re-
lease, or have his treatment strategy changed.' 6
While preventive injunctions may be effective to correct individual,
discrete abuses in institutions which generally comport with constitu-
tional standards, 17 they will be inadequate if the institutions contain
widespread, systemic violations of constitutional rights. By the time an
injunction is issued, the specific constitutional abuse complained of
might have ceased, only to be replaced by other illegal acts not covered
by the injunction. Second, those likely to be damaged by the institu-
tion's wrongful acts, and therefore most likely to be plaintiffs in liti-
gation, are often under the control of the institution and sometimes
are incompetent. This makes it difficult for them to find out what
their legal rights are, obtain legal assistance, and seek preventive in-
junctions on their own behalf.' It is also difficult to obtain informa-
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th
Cir. 1971) (equalization of municipal services); Doe v. General Hosp., 434 F.2d 427, 432-33
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (hospital services for indigents); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th
Cir. 1968) (cruel and unusual punishment in prisons); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (provision of public education to handicapped children); In-
mates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (provision of
adequate facilities and trained personnel at juvenile corrections institution); Brenneman
v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Calif. 1972) (provision of greater facilities for pretrial
detainees); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Snpp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971) (cruel and unusual punishment in prisons); United States v. Alsbrook, 336
F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971) (construction of youth treatment facility). But see Burnham
v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319
(5th Cir. 1974), which was consolidated for argument in the Fifth Circuit with Wyatt. In
its Wyatt opinion, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Burnhamn district court's holding that a
right to treatment suit contravened the Eleventh Amendment.
States have generally complied with this type of judicial decree, and therefore most of
these cases do not confront the question of what measures the court will take to enforce
the order which requires the expenditure of state funds. See Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964); Note, Enforcement of Judicial Financing Orders: Constitutional
Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 GEO. L.J. 393 (1970); Wyatt Case Comment, supra note
5, at 1301. One means suggested by the plaintiffs in Wyatt to finance the implementation
of the decree was a judicial sale of the extensive land holdings of the Alabama Mental
Health Board. The defendants opposed this measure, and the court never took action on
the request. 344 F. Supp. at 377.
16. Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 782, 799
(1969). Such a change in an individual plaintiff's confinement will moot an individual
plaintiff's lawsuit but not a class action. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 556-59
(1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Preventive injunctions, while less suitable for the reform of institutional defects,
will play a continual role in ensuring adequate treatment and proper classification of
individual mental patients confined in institutions which, on the whole, are run in a
constitutional manner. As Chief Justice Flaschner of the District Courts of Massachusetts
commented, "the individual case may be more typical of the right to treatment artillery
to be faced by most judges, particularly in the state courts." Flaschner, Legal Rights of
the Mentally Handicapped: A Judge's Viewpoint, 60 A.B.A.J. 1371, 1374 (1974).
18. See Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Snpp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (broad structural changes
ordered in reformatories run by the Texas Youth Council). Before the constitutional
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tion about the conditions within the institution, which prevents persons
on the outside-such as friends or relatives of residents-from identify-
ing abuses and obtaining assistance for the residents. Moreover, judicial
evaluation of institutional conditions, practices, and procedures is
impeded by a professed expertise on the part of the institution, 9 so
that a court considering whether to issue a preventive injunction
against particular acts may not be qualified to examine a claim that
the acts are necessary as part of a comprehensive professional program.
Finally, a judge may be unable to penetrate the institutional bureauc-
racy to determine what is causing the unconstitutional conditions and
how they might be corrected. A preventive injunction may thus prove
ineffective because the administrators called upon to eliminate the
abuses either do not have sufficient control within the institution or
cannot fix responsibility within their own institutional bureaucracy.
When courts moved toward remedying problems within prisons and
mental hospitals, these characteristics of closed institutions influenced
the form of the judicial orders issued and the techniques of imple-
mentation relied upon. In devising techniques for implementation of
institutional change, courts have sought to make the judicial process
more available to the institution's residents, thus partially insulating
them from the control of the institution. Courts have also sought means
to obtain independent, reliable information about what is going on in
the institution, to subject the institution's professed expertise to the
scrutiny of other experts, and to "open up" the institutional bureauc-
racy by giving staff at all levels access to the court.
To accomplish this, the judiciary has drawn on its authority to
fashion "appropriate instruments required for the performance of [its]
duties, '" including the power to appoint judicial officers.2 1 In addi-
issues could be adjudicated, it was necessary for the court to issue an order protecting the
rights of incarcerated youths to confer in private with their attorneys. Morales v. Turman,
326 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
19. This professed institutional expertise, combined with the fact that the institutions
are run by the executive branch of the government, led courts to abide by the "hands-off"
doctrine, an extreme rule of judicial deference which virtually immunized the correctional
system from judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir.
1969). See generally Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for
Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1971); Note, Decency and Fairness: An
Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971); Note, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,
72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
20. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). The authority of federal courts to
appoint masters derives from both their inherent powers, id., and FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
21. Another area of law in which courts have used judicially appointed officers to
aid in the implementation of their decrees is employment discrimination. Under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), several courts have appointed
"administrators" or committees, responsible to the court, to develop and then supervise
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tion to employing traditional remedies, such as the appointment of
masters22 or receivers,23 courts have fashioned several new ones.
One novel judicial approach has combined the factfinding role of
the traditional master and the supervisory role of the traditional re-
ceiver to form a "hybrid" master to aid in the implementation of
structural injunctions. For example, in Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,24 two masters, one an attorney and
one a special educator, were charged with both evaluating and imple-
menting a plan drafted by the state to provide a suitable public educa-
tion for retarded children.2- In Knight v. Board of Education, -20 the
court, after ruling that the school must provide appropriate educa-
tional opportunities for suspended students, appointed a three member
"Masters Committee of Educational Experts" to enforce the order by
hearing complaints of individual suspended students.
2 7
the implementation of a program to eliminate discrimination in employment. See gen-
erally Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility, 60
CORxELL L. REv. 53 (1974).
22. Masters are primarily, and were originally, fact-finders for the court, appointed
when factual issues are highly complicated or require special expertise for evaluation.
Ransom v. Winn, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 295 (1855) (value produce); Wilson v. Homestead
Valve Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955) (compute
damages for breach of contract); Pallma v. Fox, 182 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1950) (compute
damages); Spaeth v. Journal Printing Co., 139 F. Supp. 188 (D. Alas. 1956) (audit books).
Masters have also been given responsibility by courts to provide aid in procedural matters.
E.g., First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957) (supervise discovery in antitrust suit); Schwininer %.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956) (admissibility of
evidence); Motley, Green, & Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 174 F. 734 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1909); Waldo Theatre Corp. v. Dondis, 1 F.R.D. 591 (S.D. Me. 1941) (supervise discovery);
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 28 F. Snpp. 665 (D. Del. 1939) (admissibility of
evidence). See generally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUMs. L.
REv: 452 (1958).
23. Receivers, in contrast to masters, are primarily "supervisory" rather than "advisory"
officials. A receiver is a court official designated to hold, manage, or liquidate property
when that property is threatened with irreparable harm. Receivership is warranted when
the party that has been in control of the property or organization in question is grossly
mismanaging it, or when the management is so divided that the operation of the organiza-
tion has been brought to a standstill. For a comparison of the traditional remedies of
masters and receivers, see Note, Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALC L.J. 103,
106-13 (1960).
The distinction between masters and receivers is sometimes blurred. For example, courts
have appointed special masters to supervise corporate and union elections, after finding
that supervision by the organization's officers would bias the result. See, e.g., Schonfeld v.
Raftery, 271 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967); B rtlett v. Gates,
118 F. 66 (C.C. Colo. 1902); Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J.
1221, 1253-56 (1961). These "special masters" were, in effect, limited receivers with specific
responsibility to supervise the election. The receivership was limited because there was
no charge of gross mismanagement of the organization in general, simply gross nis-
management of the impending election.
24. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent decree). See generally Kirp, Buss & Kuril-
off, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposails, '62
CALIF. L. REV. 40, 58-82 (1974).
25. 343 F. Supp. at 288.
26. 48 F.R.D. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
27. A "hybrid" master has also been used in at least one case involving a claim of
"cruel and unusual punishment" in a prison. Some time after determining that the
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Another new implementation technique used by the courts has been
the assignment of monitors. Unlike the "hybrid" masters, who are
delegated some of the direct responsibility for implementing the court's
order, monitors have been appointed simply to observe the implementa-
tion process and report their observations to the court. They have been
used when the primary impediment to implementation is the inability
of the court and the plaintiffs to obtain accurate information about
what is occurring within the institution. For example, in Gates v.
Collier,2s the district court concluded that a local prison was not com-
plying with a broad order 20 to eliminate the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment, and placed the prison under the direct scrutiny
of the court by appointing a "federal monitor" to inspect prison records
and observe the management and operation of the prison.30 In other
cases involving similar problems, courts have required the defendants
to file periodic reports on compliance.31
conditions in the Orleans Parish Prison violated the Constitution, the district court in
Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970), found that conditions had not been
corrected. The court appointed a special master and charged him with fashioning a plan
for improving the prison. 1 PRISON L. REP. 185 (1971). See Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F.
Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (master's plan, which included such extensive reforms as the con-
struction of a new hospital, the creation of psychiatric, dental, and drug abuse programs,
and the upgrading of qualifications for all security personnel, accepted). In Mills v. Board
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (mentally impaired children have a right to a
special public education), the court stated:
If any dispute should arise between the defendants which requires for its resolution
a degree of expertise in the field of education not possessed by the Court, the Court
will appoint a special master pursuant to the provisions of Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to assist the Court in resolving the issue.
Id. at 877. To date, no such appointment has been made.
28. 501 F.2d 1291, 1321 (5th Cir. 1974), a!f'g 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (dis-
cusses the appointment of the monitor). See 16 Crim. L. Rep. 2481 (1975) (later opinion).
29. The original order of the court prohibited the arbitrary and unjustified censor-
ship of mail, required that the administrative discipline proceedings comport with due
process standards, proscribed corporal punishment, and established standards for con-
finement in maximum security. 349 F. Supp. at 893-905.
30. A monitor with similar powers was appointed in Wayne County Jail Inmates v.
Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 1 PRISON L. REP. 186, 188 (Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., Mich..
1972). The monitor made frequent visits to the jail, investigated inmate complaints of
noncompliance with the court order, and reported to the court ois his findings. See gen-
erally Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1971)
(directing the district court to consider the appointment of monitors at Attica l'rison in
New York); Stroman v. Griffin, 331 F. Supp. 226, 330 (S.D. Ga. 1971) (court did not ap-
point a monitor, but the judge noted, "A few weeks ago I paid an unannounced visit to
the jail.").
31. Wald & Schwartz, Trying a Juvenile Right to Treatment Suit: Pointers and Pitfalls
for Plaintiffs, 12 A.m. CRIst. L. REV. 125, 162 (1974). Such periodic reports were filed ill
Wyatt.
Laughlin McDonald, Director of the Southern Regional Office of the ACLU Founda-
tion, has stated that most of the prison desegregation decrees issued by southern federal
courts are unimplemented, and that this could have been avoided if more courts had
retained jurisdiction and required the defendants to submit periodic reports to the court.
McDonald, Enforcing the Prison Desegregation Decree (unpublished paper delivered at
All ACLU Lawyers' Conference, Mar. 24, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Cf. Lee
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A third method of implementation has involved the judicial ap-
pointment of ombudsmen 32 to hear inmate complaints and g-rievances,
conduct investigations, and make recommendations to the court. Un-
like masters and monitors, which are envisioned as temporary, interim
measures to aid in the implementation of decrees until compliance is
achieved, ombudsmen have sometimes been included as part of the
substantive relief, i.e., part of the restructuring of the institution.33
For example, in Morales v. Turman,34 the court appointed an ombuds-
v. Washington, 263 F. Supp. 327, 333 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (per Johnson, J.), af 'd per curiam,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (elaborate reporting requirements).
Patricia M. Wald, attorney for plaintiffs in Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972) (right of mentally impaired children in Washington, D.C., to be provided
special public education), has noted that the failure of the court decree to require
periodic reports has hindered implementation and impaired the ability of the attorneys
for the plaintiffs and amici to protect their clients' rights:
The Mills decree makes no provision for periodic reporting on implementation to
either the court, plaintiffs' attorneys, or the public, once the defendants' plan and
the September interim report were made. As a result, the plaintiffs' attorneys,
though they are legally entitled and ethically compelled to institute contempt or
enforcement proceedings, if they think the decree is not being enforced, must depend
on random complaints or their own investigative efforts to find out what is going
on. Practically, this is difficult for busy practicing attorneys to do in a system with
200 separate schools and a possible 14,000 students who may be in their orbit of
interest. Similarly, school administrators may be too busy or too harassed to compile
information they don't legally have to, or they may not seek gratuitously to supply
their potential adversaries with full details on internal mistakes or problems.
Wald, Implementing Mills: The First Six Months, at 12-13, Mar. 1973 (unpublished paper,
on file with Yale Law Journal) (footnote omitted).
32. The ombudsman is a government official who hears and investigates complaints
by private citizens against government agencies and officials. The concept originated in
Scandinavia, where the ombudsman is a commissioner appointed by the national legisla-
ture. In the traditional model, an ombudsman (1) is independent of the agency or
organization which he investigates, (2) has full powers of investigation, including access
to all official files and to all personnel, and (3) makes recommendations for changes, but
has limited or no power to order that the recommendations be implemented. Acceptance
of the ombudsman's recommendations depends on the respect for his office and on his
ability to publicize the recommendations. See generally Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieom.
budsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1 (1965). For a discussion of the role that ombudsmen in
Scandinavia have played in the mental health field, see Broderick, Justice in the Books
or Justice in Action-An Institutional Approach to Involuntary Hospitalization for Mental
Illness, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 547, 637-44 (1971). See generally Broderick, One-Legged
Ombudsman in a Mental Hospital: An Over-the-Shoulder Glance at an Experimental
Project, 22 CA' H. U.L. REV. 517 (1973).
In New York, ombudsmen have been appointed by executive decision to avoid abuses
in the juvenile justice system. The program was established in 1971 by the New York State
Division for Youth (DFY) to provide their own administrators with independent reports
on conditions in the state training schools, and to establish a mechanism for handling
youths' complaints. Nejelski & LaPook, Monitoring the Juvenile Justice System? How Calt
You Tell Where You're Going, If You Don't Know Where You Are?, 12 \.Ni. CRINM. L.
REV. 9, 29 (1974); Comment, The Penal Ombudsman: A Step Toward Penal Reform, 3
PAc. L.J. 166 (1972). However, the DFY ombudsman does not fit the traditional model in
that he is neither independent of the agency nor able to publicize his recommendations
as a method of bringing about their implementation.
33. See Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (provision for a perma-
nent ombudsman as part of a restructuring of a youth prison agreed upon by the plain-
tiffs and defendants but not coupled with a retention of jurisdiction by the court).
34. 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (the ombuds-
man appointed was a relatively low-ranking employee of the Texas Youth Council (TYC),
which ran the juvenile institutions that were the subject of the litigation).
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man during the pendency of the litigation to hear grievances of youths
confined in state juvenile institutions, to report to the court on viola-
tions of the court's order, and to make recommendations to the de-
fendant state officials.35 The final order in Morales proposed to make
the appointment permanent.36
Courts have thus developed several innovative and flexible tech-
niques for implementing judicial orders. Before examining the imple-
mentation process in the Wyatt case, it is necessary first to explore
briefly the course of litigation and the final decree that emerged.
II. The Decree in Wyatt
The facts which gave rise to the Wyatt litigation were quite different
from those which underlay the decree. Wyatt originated as a labor
dispute. Cuts in the Alabama cigarette tax forced the Mental Health
Commissioner, Dr. Stonewall B. Stickney, to order the firing of 99
employees of Bryce Hospital, an institution for the mentally ill in
Tuscaloosa, Ala.37 On October 23, 1970,38 the patients at Bryce and
the discharged employees filed suit to rescind the order, alleging that
the terminations would deny the approximately 5000 patients any
prospect of receiving adequate treatment.39 In chambers, Judge
Johnson stated that the employees could probably obtain adequate
relief in state court, but added that he was concerned about the plight
of the patients within the institution for whom, without the care of
these professionals, adequate treatment would not be available. 4°
Largely in response to Judge Johnson's expressed concern, the plain-
tiffs shifted the focus of the litigation to the adequacy of care within
Bryce Hospital.4 1 On January 4, 1971, the plaintiffs amended the
original complaint to request "that this court declare that patients
confined to any state-operated mental health facility are constitution-
35. 364 F. Supp. 166. The ombudsman was permitted to attend all staff meetings
which discussed policy and procedures, and was given access to all records of the
institution.
36. 383 F. Supp. 53, 120-21 (E.D. Tex. 1974). Although the court called the permanent
post a "monitor," the description more closely fits the term "ombudsman" that was used
originally; some confusion in terminology should be expected when new mechanisms are
fashioned.
37. See p. 1349 infra.
38. Complaint at 1 (Oct. 23, 1970) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The defendants
included Stickney, the members of the Alabama Mental Health Board, and then Gov.
Albert P. Brewer.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Drake Interview, supra note 6. See Drake, supra note 5, at 596 n.27.
41. Drake Interview, supra note 6. The Fifth Circuit stated that the reason for the
shift in the suit's focus was "not entirely clear from the record before us." 503 F.2d at
1308.
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ally entitled to adequate, competent treatment," and that "defendants
be enjoined from operating Bryce Hospital in a manner that does not
conform to constitutional standards of delivering adequate mental
treatment to its patients."4' With the issue thus more clearly focused,
the Wyatt litigation proceeded through a series of stages. At each stage
the court apparently sought to encourage voluntary compliance by the
defendants while making clear that it would assume a more active role
if necessary.
The first stage of the litigation centered on the right to treatment43
and on the factual circumstances of the patients at Bryce. The court
held that this right existed, emanating from the due process clause.44
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons
and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very
fundamentals of due process.45
The court found that the conditions and treatment methods within the
institution were "scientifically and medically inadequate" and "failed
to conform to any known minimums established for providing treat-
ment for the mentally ill. ' ' 40 Defendants were given ninety days to
develop and file with the court a plan for the provision of adequate
treatment at Bryce. 47 The court invited the Department of Justice to
enter the case as amicus curiae48 and granted the request of several
national mental health and civil liberties organizations to participate
as amici.49
42. Motion-styled "Amendment"-for Leave to Amend Complaint (Jan. 4, 1971) (on
file with Yale Law Journal).
43. In recent years, many lower federal and state courts have held that persons in-
voluntarily confined without a criminal conviction have a constitutional right to receive
treatment. See cases cited in Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 5, at 1316-18
nn.2, 4.
44. 325 F. Supp. at 785. See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)("due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed").
45. 325 F. Supp. at 785. The court stated that the right to treatment is a present right
to which the plaintiffs have an immediate claim, and that "the failure to provide suitable
and adequate treatment to the mentally ill cannot be justified by lack of staff or facili-
ties." Id. at 784.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 785-86.
48. Id. at 786.
49. Order (Aug. 20, 1911). The organizations included the American Psychological
Association, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union and the American Association on Mental Deficiency. The National Association for
Mental Health and the National Association for Retarded Citizens joined as amici for
the appeal. All amici were allowed full participation rights, including the right to
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Halpern Interview, supra note 6. All amici,
with the exception/of the United States, were represented by the Center for Law and
Social Policy, Washington, D.C.
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During the next stage of the litigation the court granted plaintiffs'
amendment to enlarge the class to include patients involuntarily com-
mitted to all three Alabama mental hospitals-Bryce, Partlow State
School and Hospital (for the mentally retarded), in Tuscaloosa, and
Searcy Hospital (for the mentally ill), in Mount Vernon. " In De-
cember 1971, the court recognized three requisites for effective treat-
ment: "(1) a humane psychological and physical environment, (2)
qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment
and (3) individualized treatment plans."' ' . It found the defendants had
failed to meet these requisites, -5 2 and therefore set the case for a hearing
at which the parties and amici were to present evidence on conditions
in the institutions and to propose detailed minimum standards which
would comply with the three general requisites of effective treatment. 53
Decision was deferred on the amici's request to appoint a panel of
masters to take over the operation of the institutions.54
At the hearings5 5 on conditions in the institutions, the evidence
established specific deficiences in treatment at Alabama's state mental
hospitals.5 6 At the close of the hearings the court, impressed by the
50. 334 F. Supp. at 1342 n.1 (1971).
51. Id. at 1343.
52. Id. The court's finding that defendants had failed to meet the minimum conditions
of treatment was based on a report filed by defendants that stated their recent efforts to
improve the institutions and the plans for continued improvements, Report of Alabama
Department of Mental Health (Sept. 23, 1971), to which plaintiffs and amici filed detailed
objections. Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Report (Oct. 13, 1971); Response of U.S.
to Defendants' Report (Nov. 15, 1971). The facts supporting these findings were sum-
marized by the court:
[T]he dormitories are barn-like structures with no privacy for the patients .... The
toilets in restrooms seldom ... have partitions between them. These are dehumanizing
factors which degenerate the patient's self-esteem ... contributing to the poor psy-
chological environment are the shoddy wearing apparel furnished the patients, the
nontherapeutic work assigned ... and the degrading and humiliating admissions
procedures which creates in the patient an impression of the hospital as a prison or
as a "crazy house."
334 F. Supp. at 1343.
53. 334 F. Supp. at 1344; 344 F. Supp. at 375; 344 F. Supp. at 390.
54. 334 F. Supp. at 1344.
55. Upon motion of the defendants, separate hearings were held on treatment for the
mentally retarded at Partlow and for the mentally ill at Bryce and Searcy. Defendants'
Motion (Jan. 4, 1972).
56. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Ass'n on Mental Deficiency, American Civil
Liberties Union, American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n, American Psychological Ass'n, National
Ass'n for Mental Health, and National Ass'n for Retarded Children at 5 (Nov. 7, 1972),
503 F.2d 1305 (5oth Cir. 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Amici's Appeal Brief]. The evidence showed a lack of individualized treatment plans and
programs, id. at 29; a lack of privacy, id. at 20; unsafe and unsanitary conditions, id. at
21-22; malnutrition, id. at 22-23; inadequate staff, id. at 25-28; and inappropriate staff
attitudes, id. The expert testimony often revealed shocking conditions. For example,
Testimony established that four residents died due to understaffing, lack of super-
vision, and brutality. One had a garden hose inserted in his rectum for five minutes
by a working inmate who was cleaning him; one died when a fellow inmate hosed
him with scalding water; another died when soapy water was forced into his mouth;
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urgency of the situation, issued an Interim Emergency Order "to
protect the lives and well-being of the residents of Partlow." -,
In the last stage of the litigation, the court issued two final "Orders
and Decrees" covering the three institutions.-8 Relying upon stipula-
tions entered into by the parties and amici and drawing upon the
largely uncontested evidence of the hearings,;" the court promulgated
a comprehensive list of standards held to be the constitutional require-
ments of adequate treatment.60
and the last died by a self-administered overdose of drugs which had been in-
adequately secured.
Id. at 25. An expert witness testified that:
I found one girl ... squatting on the floor in a sort of wooden cage-like con-
trivance.... I was told that she spent her waking hours in this wooden cage.... I
asked what happened when she is released from this thing, and I was told that she
would then scoot along the floor. I was also told that she could stand....
I asked the attendant what happened if this girl was given a walker, and I was told
this had never been done; it had never been tried. I noticed one of the other young
girls who was tied in bed by a waist restraint jumped out of bed and ... was prompt-
ly put back in .... I was told that the doctors had mandated she be tied in bed,
because when she assumed an upright position, she tended to vomit.
Testimony of Dr. Philip Roos, at 16 (Feb. 29, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Roos Testimony] (describing Partlow State School and Hospital).
The food was slopped out unceremoniously by the working residents. There was a
kind of a cake ... as part of the meal, and it was handed out by the working residents
using their hands and dropping it on the trays. There were no knives or forks.
Many of the residents ate with their hands ....
Id. at 12. One witness summarized "life" at Partlow as follows:
I think if you walk through Partlow, you can see ... the effect-the people who begin
to become involved in eccentric mannerisms, the rocking back and forth, peculiar
behavior mechanisms, the people who sit in a semi-stupor in a place, without any
activity, the people who slowly deteriorate and turn to the simple elements of human
behavior .... We have ample documentation in this country that individuals who
come to institutions and can walk stop walking, who come to institutions and can
talk will stop talking, who come to institutions and can feed themselves will stop
feeding themselves; in other words, in many other ways, a steady process of deteriora-
tion.
Amici's Appeal Brief at 33 (emphasis in Brief).
57. Interim Emergency Order (Mar. 2, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
58. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
59. See Memorandum of Agreement of Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Amici Curiae
American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n, American Psychological Ass'n, American Civil Liberties
Union, and American Ass'n on Mental Deficiency, at 1 (Feb. 27, 1972) (on file with Yale
Law Journal); Amici's Appeal Brief, supra note 56, at 10 n.5. These stipulated standards
included the following: (1) A patient's sense of his or her own dignity and privacy is a
prerequisite for effective treatment, id. at 20; (2) mental institutions should not be
maintained on the uncompensated, nontherapeutic labor of the inmates, id. at 23; (3) the
overuse of restraints and isolation is an unacceptable substitute for active treatment
programs, id.; (4) every institution should provide for the safety of its residents, id. at 21;
and (5) staff-patient ratios must be maintained at a level comnensurate with the needs
of the patient population, id. at 25-28. The mental health associations noted that:
[A1l1 49 of the standards relating to Partlow State School and Hospital-with the
exception of the standards relating to seclusion, temperature, Human Rights Com-
mittee and proper care of patients' physical conditions, such as tuberculosis-were
agreed upon and stipulated to by the parties.
Id. at 10 n.6. This agreement greatly simplified the district court's task at this in-
termediate stage of the litigation, because it made it unnecessary to use adversary hearings
to develop the complicated treatment standards.
60. The standards for Partlow provided that the residents have a right to: adequate
habilitation, 344 F. Supp. at 396; individualized habilitation plans, id. at 397; a humane
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Most significantly for the implementation of the decree examined
in this Note, the court appointed a seven member Human Rights
Committee61 for each institution to oversee defendants' progress in
complying with the designated standards. 2 The purpose and function
of these committees was defined as follows:
... [T]hese committees ... shall have review of all research pro-
posals and all rehabilitation programs, to ensure that the dignity
and the human rights of patients are preserved. The committees
also shall advise and assist patients who allege that their legal
rights have been infringed or that the Mental Health Board has
failed to comply with judicially ordered guidelines. At their dis-
cretion, the committees may consult appropriate, independent
specialists who shall be compensated by the defendant Board. 3
In a footnote, the court supplemented the scope of each Human Rights
Committee's function:
The recitation of the licenses of this committee ... is not intended
to be inclusive. The Human Rights Committee of each mental
health institution shall be authorized, within the limits of reason-
ableness, to pursue whatever action is necessary to accomplish its
function. 4
The court enjoined the defendants "from failing to implement fully
and with dispatch each of the standards," 65 and further noted:
The massive program of reform and reorganization to be launched
at Partlow requires the guidance of a professionally qualified and
experienced administrator. Consequently, this Court will order
that defendants employ such an individual on a permanent basis.
Should defendants fail to do so, or otherwise fail to comply timely
with the provisions of this decree, the Court will be obligated to
appoint a master. 6
physical and psychological environment, including the right to dignity, privacy, and
humane care, id. at 399-405; and sufficient qualified staff to provide care, id. at 405.
Habilitation was defined by the court as "the process by which the staff of the institu-
tion assists the resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him to
cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to
raise the level of his physical, mental, and social efficiency...." Id. at 395. The standards
were somewhat different for the two hospitals for the mentally ill-Bryce and Searcy. See
344 F. Supp. at 379.
61. Id. at 378, 392.
62. Id.
63. 344 F. Supp. at 376.
64. 344 F. Supp. at 392 n.10.
65. Id. at 394.
66. Id.
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The court stated that lack of funds was a "legally insufficient reason ' ' 7
for failing to meet Alabama's constitutional obligations.
In May 1972, Governor Wallace and the Alabama Mental Health
Board filed separate notices of appeal to the Fifth Circuit."S More than
two years later, on November 8, 1974, the Fifth Circuit issued its
opinion affirming the district court.0 9
III. Implementation of the Wyatt Decree
Before discussing in detail the problems that occurred in imple-
mentation and the roles played by the court, the parties, the amici,
and the Human Rights Committees, it is necessary to provide an over-
view of the implementation process during the two years between the
issuance of the decree and the affirmance by the Fifth Circuit. This
examination focuses primarily on one of the three institutions covered
by the decree: Partlow State School and Hospital (Partlow). The
overview presents the interactions of the parties, the problems and
changes occurring within the institution, and the significant legal ac-
tions. It is followed by a section which examines the actual function-
ing of the Partlow Human Rights Committee, the plaintiffs and amici,
and the defendants, evaluating how they handled their responsibilities
and utilized their powers. A final section addresses the general prob-
lems of implementing the Wyatt decree.
A. An Overview of Implementation
The task of implementation began several months before the final
decree with the court's Interim Emergency Order of March 2, 1972,70
which required the elimination of all hazardous and unsanitary condi-
tions at Partlow, 71 the hiring of 300 additional staff members,72 and a
reduction of the institution's population.73 The Interim Order pro-
duced some improvements in the institution, including a substantial
67. Id. (footnote omitted). The court reserved ruling on plaintiff's motion that the
Mental Health Board be directed to sell its extensive land holdings in order to provide
the funds required for the improvements. Id. at 393. The court also reserved ruling on
plaintiff's motion to enjoin the state from spending money for nonessential functions
until the necessary funds were available to meet the financial needs of the Mental Health
Board. Id.
68. Notice of Appeal of the Alabama Mental Health Board (May 12, 1972); Notice of
Appeal of Gov. George C. Wallace (May 12, 1972).
69. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. Interim Emergency Order (Mar. 2, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3.
1352
Vol. 84: 1338, 1975
The Wyatt Case
upgrading of sanitary conditions and a reduction in the population of
Partlow's wards which partially alleviated hazardous overcrowding. 74
However, the Order also caused substantial disruption in the state
executive branch 75 and in the institution.70 For example, the massive
hiring of new resident care workers, dictated by the Interim Emergency
Order, caused considerable confusion and inefficiency as experienced
staff members had to take time to train the new employees. 77
It was against this background that the final decree was issued on
April 13, 1972, and the Human Rights Committees (HRC's) were
appointed.7 8 While the powers of the HRC's were not clearly delineat-
ed, their responsibilities were. Judge Johnson instructed the HRC's to
establish "free and easy communication" between themselves and the
residents, the staff, and the administration;, to meet frequently with the
administration; to inspect the institution periodically; to determine
whether the court orders were being effectively implemented; and to
make reports to the court.79 The court also instructed the administra-
tion of the institutions that the HRC's were to be permitted full access
74. P. Roos, Progress Evaluation Report on the Partlow State School in Tuscaloosa,
Ala. at 12 (Oct. 9, 1972) (on file with )'ale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Roos
Progress Report].
75. Stickney, the Commissioner of the Alabama Board of Mental Health, was dis-
charged from his position. Among the reasons for his discharge was a disagreement with
the Governor over whether the state was bound to pay for improvements in the three
institutions that had been agreed to in stipulations before the court. Stickney, Problems
in inplementing the Right To Treatment in Alabama: The Wyatt v. Stickney Case, 25
HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 456, 457 [hereinafter cited as Stickney Article]; Stick-
ney Interview, supra note 6. James C. Folsom, Superintendent of Bryce Hospital, was also
discharged from his position. Associate Commissioner of Mental Health, Charles L. Ader-
holt, was appointed by the Governor to replace Stickney as Commissioner. Stickney In-
terview. However, Aderholt was forced to resign after one year. Stickney Interview; Drake
Interview; DeMent Interview. He was replaced by General Taylor Hardin who had
recently been forced to resign his longheld post as State Finance Commissioner because
of an alleged conflict of interest between that position and his membership in the Ala-
bama National Guard. Stickney Article, supra; Stickney Interview; Drake Interview;
Buckley Interview. Many persons interviewed expressed the view that as Finance Com-
missioner, Hardin had close political ties to Gov. Wallace and that his appointment as
Commissioner of Mental Health greatly diminished the independence of the Mental
Health Board. Stickney Interview; Martin Interview.
76. Partlow's Acting Superintendent at the time of the litigation, Peter Blouke, was
discharged almost immediately after the issuance of the decree for having cooperated
with the plaintiffs' lawyers during the litigation. Blouke Interview, supra note 6;
Baumeister Interview; Fowler Interview. Blouke was replaced by Dr. John Hottel, who
resigned after expressing frustration about dealing with the Partlow Human Rights
Committee which he unsuccessfully sought to have the court disband. Tillman Interview;
Buckley Interview; Stickney Interview. See p. 1356 infra. Hottel was replaced as super-
intendent by Richard E. Buckley, who was discharged shortly after the case was affirmed
on appeal. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1975, at 11, col. I.
77. Stickney Interview, supra note 6; Blouke Interview.
78. 344 F. Stpp. at 378, 344 F. Supp. at 392.
79. Letter from Judge Johnson to Dr. E.L. McCafferty, Jr., Chairman of the Searcy
HRC, Aug. 8, 1972 (on file with Yale Law Journao [hereinafter cited as McCafferty
Letter]. Judge Johnson sent copies of this letter to the Partlow and Bryce Human Rights
Committees.
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to the institution, staff, patients, and records, and that no reprisals
were to be taken against staff members for reporting to the HRC's.'O
Finally, the court stressed that implementation was the task of the
defendants, not of the HRC's.81
The Partlow Human Rights Committee (PHRC) quickly assumed
an aggressive stance 82 The committee divided the responsibility among
its members for investigating and reporting the progress of implemen-
tation in various areas, 3 and held bi-weekly meetings to discuss find-
ings and confer with the Partlow staff and administrators. 84
The defendants, particularly the institution's administration, re-
sented the PHRC because they felt that its activities exceeded the
scope of the decree. s5 Moreover, there was a considerable turnover of
personnel at Partlow. s0 Staff members, many of whom had been stung
by critical press coverage of the institution during the litigation, were
often frustrated by the requirements placed upon them by the decree. 7
Some complained that residents became more "unruly" as they learned
of the decree, copies of which were available to the residents.88 How-
ever, even though the administration resented the intrusion of the
PHRC and the staff complained about the decree's requirements, the
patient population continued to decrease through discharges and trans-
fers,8 9 and steps were taken to upgrade living conditions in the in-
stitution.90
On the basis of its own investigations, the PHRC contested several
of the administration's claims of progress within the institution."' For
80. Id. at 1-2.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Tillman Interview, supra note 6; Keever Interview; Stickney Interview; Buckley
Interview.
83. PHRC Report (Sept. 24, 1972).
84. Stickney Interview, supra note 6; Buckley Interview.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Buckley Interview, supra note 6.
88. Tillman Interview, supra note 6; Wagnon Interview. See 344 F. Supp. at 406
(standard 42).
89. During the first year of implementation, the resident population at Partlow
decreased substantially, due to discharges purportedly based on the diagnoses and evalua-
tions which determined whether confinement in Partlow was appropriate. See note 133
infra.
90. For example, telephones were installed. Defendants' Report to the Court Con-
cerning Partlow State School and Hospital at 86 (Oct. 10, 1972) (on file with Yale Law
Journal). Mail censorship was discontinued. Id. at 89. The wards were painted. Tillman
Interview, supra note 6. Toilet facilities were partitioned to provide residents with
greater privacy. Id. Additional staff members were hired to diagnose and evaluate
residents to determine appropriate placement and treatment. Roos Progress Report, supra
note 74, at 12, 16.
91. In addition to members' own investigations, the PHRC hired a professional con-
sultant to conduct investigations and to advise it of the most serious problems remaining
in the institution. Roos Progress Report, supra note 74, at 12, 16. For example, the con-
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example, the PHRC feared that many of the discharges designed to
relieve overcrowding were inappropriate and detrimental to some of
the patients released. 92 Eventually, it accused the administration of
"dumping"'9 3 patients to get them beyond the committee's authority.94
The PHRC informally contacted Judge Johnson for instructions on
whether the scope of its authority included discharged patients. 95 The
Judge advised the committee members to confine their attention to
patients within Partlow's walls.9 6 Information gathered by the PHRC
also led the attorneys for the plaintiff patients to charge that the ad-
ministration had violated the court's decree by failing to compensate
the patients for performing maintenance work at the institution.97 The
sultant's report noted that residents were still being confined in small, closet-like "seclusion
rooms," id. at 20, a practice which had been prohibited in the decree and which the
administration claimed had been eliminated. Defendants' Report to the Court Concerning
Partlow State School and Hospital at 100 (Oct. 10, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
92. PHRC Report (June 9, 1972).
93. Id. "Dumping" can be defined as rapidly discharging residents without services
which would enable them successfully to reenter and remain within the community. A
consultant's letter cautioned Judge Johnson against the dangers of "dumping" patients
for the purpose of reducing overcrowding: "A well planned skillfully implemented
delicate balance must be maintained between decreasing the size of institutional popula-
tions and development of community resources." Letter from James D. Clements, M.D.,
Director of the Georgia Retardation Center, Atlanta, Ga., to Judge Johnson at 2, June
11, 1973 (on file with Yale Law Journal).
94. Tillman Interview, supra note 6.
95. Id.; Wagnon Interview, Public concern was aroused when several persons who
were discharged engaged in anti-social conduct. For example, several dischargees were
arrested for indecent exposure and child molestation. PHRC Report (Apr. 16, 1973). See
p. 1374 infra.
96. These instructions created many problems for the PHRC because it was unclear
whether they only advised the committee on its priorities or whether they prohibited the
committee from operating outside the institution. The confusion was exacerbated because
some residents who were "transferred" remained on Partlow's rolls. In fact, the concept
of "Partlow's walls" became fairly nebulous in light of the increasing number of residents
participating in deinstitutionalization programs who were allowed out of the institution
for graduated intervals, and the number of residents who either ran away or wandered
off and got lost. Many committee members felt frustrated by the court's restriction of
their jurisdiction. These members felt that without the simultaneous development of
community services, the deinstitutionalization philosophy which they saw in the court's
decree and which had originally attracted their interest, would be defeated. Dinsmore
Interview, supra note 6; Keever Interview; Murphy Interview; Pernell Interview; Wagnon
Interview. See note 221 infra.
97. Motion for Specific Enforcement of Prior Orders, or in the alternative or con-
junctive, Motion to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt
(July 5, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
failed to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1966), which was
incorporated in standard 33 of the Partlow decree, 344 F. Supp. at 402-03, and in standard
18 of the Bryce and Searcy decree. 344 F. Supp. at 381. Plaintiffs requested back pay and
attorneys' fees, in addition to enforcement of the standard. The defendants responded
that they had received approval from the Department of Labor to establish work pro-
grams and that all payments to patients were made in strict compliance with 29 C.F.R. §§
524, 525, which permit certified disabled persons to be paid at a percentage of the
minimum wage based on their levels of productivity. Response of Defendants to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Specific Enforcement of July 5, 1972 (Aug. 23, 1972) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
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court amended the decree to allow therapeutic labor without compensa-
tion.98
Relations between the PHRC and the administration became very
strained during this period.99 As a result, the defendants informally
requested the court to dissolve the PHRC, alleging that the committee
was obstructing implementation.' 00 When this request was denied, the
defendants moved to obtain a clearer delineation of the powers of the
PHRC,' 0' but this motion was later withdrawn after negotiations be-
tween the parties. 0° The administration also refused to cooperate with
the PHRC's attempts to investigate reports of resident abuse. 03 When
the amount of information that the PHRC could obtain was thus
substantially reduced, the committee requested the assistance of the
local United States Attorney, who had been designated by the court
as the committee's counsel.' 04 He, in turn, enlisted the aid of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate the allegations.1a5
By the end of the first year after the final decree, relations between
the administration and the PHRC had stabilized somewhat. The ad-
ministration had accommodated itself to the occasional presence of the
PHRC; there were no longer acrimonious conflicts over patient super-
vision and safety or over sanitation in the institution. The administra-
tion took the first steps toward meeting the standards set forth in the
decree, primarily the formulation of a comprehensive habilitation
plan for each individual resident. 0 6 However, progress was very slow
in actually carrying out these plans, and few were fully infplemented.17
Notwithstanding these improvements, new issues of disagreement con-
98. Order (Dec. 4, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal). According to the plaintiffs'
lawyers and the present counsel for the Mental Health Board, the manner in which Judge
Johnson handled this proceeding demonstrated that the court would not welcome further
motions to show cause. Dean Interview, supra note 6; Drake Interview; Humphries Inter-
view.
99. This tension was accompanied by a good deal of backbiting. For example, Dr.
Stickney characterized the PHRC members as "pharisees" who "believe their own propa-
ganda," Stickney Interview, supra. note 6, and one former PHRC member recalled that
"we were heartily despised by the institution." Keever Interview.
100. Drake Interview, supra note 6; Stickney Interview; Tillman Interview.
101. Motion for Order of Modification (July 19, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
102. Dismissal of Defendants' Motion for Order of Modification and Plaintiffs' and
Defendants' Joint Motion for Order of Modification (Aug. 4. 1972) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
103. Tillman Interview, supra note 6.
104. Letter from Judge Johnson to Ira DeMent, U.S. Attorney, July 20, 1972 (on file
with Yale Law Journal). See note 172 infra.
105. PHRC Report (Dec. 11, 1972); DeMent Interview, supra note 6.
106. The formulation of these habilitation plans meant that every resident had been
examined, diagnosed, and prescribed a treatment plan which, if implemented, would
provide self-proficiency training to enable the resident to reenter the community. Buckley
Interview, supra note 6.
107. Buckley Interview, supra note 6; Internal Memorandum to Charles R. Halpern,
Center for Law and Social Policy, June 17, 1973 (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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tinued to arise between the PHRC and the administration. The com-
mittee found that several Partlow residents had been sterilized, which
it believed was in violation of a standard in the decree banning "un-
usual or hazardous treatment" without the prior review and consent of
the PHRC and of the resident or designated guardian. 08 On the basis
of the PHRC's findings, the plaintiff patients submitted a motion to
Judge Johnson for further relief. 09 A three-judge court was convened
and struck down Alabama's sterilization law. 1 0 Thereafter, Judge
Johnson amended the decree to include due process standards for the
sterilization of residents."'
Grounds for further conflict were contained in the first annual
reports, submitted to the court in 1973,112 in which the defendants and
the PHRC each evaluated compliance with the standards of the decree.
The reports showed considerable disagreement as to the levels of com-
pliance then achieved, because the defendants and the PHRC evaluated
compliance by different methods. The PHRC measured compliance
separately for each standard in the decree, and noted whether the in-
stitution was in complete compliance, partial compliance, or "no com-
pliance," i.e., had failed to take any steps since the issuance of the
decree. 13 The PHRC did not consider restraints on the administra-
108. Standard 30, 344 F. Supp. at 402.
109. Amended Complaint or alternatively Motion for Further Relief (July 24, 1973)
(on file with Yale Law Journal). Plaintiffs argued that ALA. CODE tit. 40, § 243 (1958) was
unconstitutional on its face because it permitted the superintendent to prescribe and
authorize the sterilization of any resident without standards or guidelines, irrespective of
whether or not the superintendent was a physician, in violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment" contained in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Amended Complaint, supra. The following allegation was offered to illustrate the
statute's potential for abuse: "[A] physician ... hired by the Defendants... suggested to
the Superintendent and others that patients not be sterilized by tubal ligation but that
numbers of patients could be lined up against a wall and zapped with cobalt radiation
first in one ovary and then the other." Id. at 3.
110. Wyatt v. Aderholt, Civil No. 3195-N(B) (M.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 1973) (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
Ill. The court-ordered standards, which were formulated by the Justice Department,
can be summarized as follows: 1) sterilization must be in the best interest of the patient;
2) sterilization must be a contraceptive measure of last resort; 3) all sterilizations are
banned for persons under 21 years of age; 4) sterilizees must be capable of giving, and
must in fact give, their informed consent, except that surrogate consent will be permitted
where the patient is incapable of giving such informed consent if that surrogate's con-
sent is reviewed and approved by a Review Committee and a court of competent jurisdic-
tion; 5) records shall be maintained of all Review Committee decisions and the reasons
therefor. United States' Proposed Standards for Sterilization of Mentally Retarded
.Residents of State Retardation Facilities 1-2, 5 (Oct. 29, 1973), Wyatt v. Aderholt, Civil
No. 3195-N(B) (M.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
112. Progress Report of the Partlow State School and Hospital (June 1, 1973) (on file
with Yale Law Journal); Report 6f the Human Rights Committee for Partlow State
School and Hospital (Apr. 2, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
113. Report of the Human Rights Committee for Partlow State School and Hospital
(Apr. 2, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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tion, such as lack of funds, in judging whether the institution was in
compliance 114 The defendants also considered each standard separately
but their method of evaluation emphasized existing constraints. They
regarded the institution as being in compliance if it had met the
standard to the extent possible at that time."I5 The administration
viewed the PHRC's evaluations and recommendations as unrealistic
and as interfering with its authority."" An example of this conflict
was a PHRC recommendation that the Partlow mental institution
terminate the operation of its medical hospital and instead contract
for medical services with the local municipal hospital."1 7 The Super-
intendent of Partlow informed the PHRC that he regarded such policy-
making as an encroachment on his authority, but the PHRC was
generally undaunted by administration criticism.""
Throughout the first year and a half, the court avoided involvement
in specific disputes between the PHRC and the administration. For
example, the PHRC sent. a letter to Judge Johnson requesting permis-
sion to hire a paid staff of resident advocates to better enable the com-
mittee to protect the rights of the patients within the institution." 9 The
Superintendent of Partlow opposed the proposal on the ground that
the staff adequately represented the patients' interests. 20 The Judge
deferred decision on the committee's request, stating that he would not
"take any action on this proposal until appellate review of this Court's
decision in this case has been completed."' 2 '
Issues concerning the situation within the institution remained mat-
ters of dispute between the PHRC and the administration.122 The
114. Tillman Interview, supra note 6; Keever Interview; Buckley Interview.
115. Buckley Interview, supra note 6.
116. Id.
117. PHRC Report (July 9, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
118. Id.
119. PHRC Report (Apr. 1, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal); A Proposal for
Paid Staff Persons to be Assigned to Partlow State School and Hospital's Human Rights
Committee (Apr. 15, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
120. PHRC Report (Apr. 1, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Buckley Interview,
supra note 6.
121. Letter from Judge Johnson to Harriet Tillman, Apr. 18, 1974 (on file with Yale
Law Journal). See note 221 infra.
122. For example, a dispute arose concerning the institution's policy of locking all
doors between wards and buildings. The administration claimed that the locked doors
were necessary to prevent theft, and to protect the safety of residents who lived on
second- and third-floor wards enclosed by fire escapes. PHRC Report (Aug. 2, 1974) (on
file with Yale Law Journal); Buckley Interview, supra note 6. The PHRC stated that the
locked door policy created a fire hazard, was antithetical to principles of normalization
enunciated in the decree, and was used only because of inadequate supervision. For a
discussion of normalization principles, see testimony of Dr. Philip Roos, reported in 1
P.L.I., LEGAL RIGHTs OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 487 (B. Ennis, P. Friedman & B.
Gitlin eds. 1973). The PHRC requested the administration to develop a plan for a
security system which would permit rapid exit in the event of fire. PHRC Report (Aug.
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PHRC continued to submit its grievances and recommendations to
the court. The court received most of these reports without comment,
and did not use them as a basis for modifying or extending the decree.
However, it responded to the June 1974 PHRC annual report,123 filed
a year and a half after the final decree, with a sua sponte order direct-
ing the defendants to show cause why they were not in compliance with
the committee's recommendations. 24 The defendants responded to the
order by stating that the institution either was in compliance or would
be in the near future. 12 5 Shortly thereafter, the Superintendent pro-
mulgated a directive to his staff requiring all meetings between Partlow
personnel (and patients) and the PHRC to be cleared with his office,
adding that he would prohibit any meeting which he deemed "un-
reasonable."' 26 When the PHRC reported this to the court, 27 the
defendants filed a "Petition for Clarification"' 28 of the PHRC's
responsibilities. The court ruled that the Superintendent's directive
violated the court order by severely limiting the committee's access to
the institution, and it therefore enjoined the Superintendent from
interfering with the PHRC's activities' 29
2, 1974). The administration maintained that this decision was within its discretion and
not covered by the decree, and it therefore regarded the issue as beyond the authority
of the PHRC. Id.; Buckley Interview, supra note 6. In contrast, Bryce Hospital instituted
an "unlocked doors" policy in response to the decree's call for treatment in the least re-
strictive setting. After Bryce unlocked all doors between wards and buildings, some
residents wandered away from the institution and caused a considerable disturbance in
the community. A member of the Bryce HRC expressed the belief that the zeal with
which Bryce's administration "over-complied" with the order was intended to provoke
the community and embarrass the court. Wagnon Interview. See p. 1374 infra.
123. Third [Annual] Report to the United States Court by the Human Rights Com-
mittee for Partlow State School and Hospital (June 24, 1974) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Third Annual Report].
124. Order to Show Cause (June 25, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The order
did not direct the defendants to "show cause why they should not be held in contempt";
it instead directed them to show catse why they were not in compliance.
125. Defendants' Response to Order to Show Cause at 1-9 (July 24, 1974) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). Although they did not express it to the court, several of the de-
fendants indicated discontent because they felt they were being held to show cause why
they had failed to implement PHRC recommendations that were not required by the
original decree. Buckley Interview, supra note 6; Humphries Interview. Among them-
selves, the defendants voiced their displeastre with the growing powers of the PHRC,
which they thought allowed the committee to enforce its own priorities through the court
in areas which should have been left to administrative discretion. Id.; Buckley Interview.
126. Standard Procedure Directive (Aug. 26, 1974) (concerning appearances of residents
and staff before the HRC) (on file with Yale Law Journal). In an interview, Buckley ex-
plained that his directive was not aimed at severing communication between the in-
stitution and the PHRC; he stated that as long as he made himself available to the
committee it had full access to the institution. Buckley Interview, supra note 6.
127. Letter from John Mathews to Judge Johnson, Aug. 30, 1974 (on file with Yale
Law Journal); Report of Partlow Human Rights Committee (Aug. 31, 1974) (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
128. Defendants' Petition for Clarification (Aug. 30, 1974) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
129. Order (Sept. 26, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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Several weeks later, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Wyatt case on
appeal, 130 and remanded it to the district court for a "determination of
good faith efforts by state authorities to ensure [the constitutional
right to treatment]."' 131 The first phase of implementation thus
ended. 32 It had resulted in substantial improvements within the in-
stitution, but there still remained a large disparity between the reforms
achieved and the judicial mandate. 33
B. Problems Relating to the Partlow Human Rights Committee and
the Parties During Implementation
1. The Partlow Human Rights Committee
In appointing the Human Rights Committees, the court created an
instrument intended to serve as its "eyes and ears" during the imple-
mentation process, to monitor the changes in the institutions and to
ensure that the constitutional rights of the residents were not in-
130. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 1318.
132. This Note is limited to studying the implementation of the Wyatt decree during
the pendency of the case on appeal. Because of Judge Johnson's uncertainty as to when
and how the court of appeals would decide the case, he acted cautiously in enforcing the
decree. See pp. 1376-77 infra. Implementation during this period therefore proceeded
slowly. However, it must be recognized that this was only the initial stage in the overall
process of implementing the Wyatt order, and that the district court's future actions
and its relationship to the defendants may change considerably after the Fifth Circuit's
affirmance of its original decision. See note 221 infra.
133. For example, the personal cleanliness of the patients and the sanitary conditions
of the physical plant improved enormously. Third Annual Report, supra note 123. But
some wards were permeated with the odor of urine and excrement. Site observation by
Diane S. Kaplan, Aug. 28, 1974. Most life-endangering conditions were removed, Third
Annual Report, supra, but doors between wards and buildings continued to be locked,
creating a fire hazard and imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on the residents'
movement. PHRC Report (Aug. 2, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Many new staff
members were recruited. Defendants-Appellants' Response to this Court's [the Fifth
Circuit's] Order of Aug. 20, 1974 (Sept. 18, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [herein-
after cited as Defendants' Response]; Buckley Interview, supra note 6; Tillman Interview.
But there remained staff members who expressed regret that they were no longer able to
use "training wands," rods which deliver an electric shock to the person touched. Inter-
view with Partlow staff member at Partlow, in Tuscaloosa, Ala., Aug. 28, 1974. Patient-
staff ratios were improved, Defendants' Response, supra, thus improving supervision, but
PHRC members continued to receive reports that "seclusion rooms" were being used, even
though they were prohibited by the decree. Tillman Interview, supra. Most patients
received planned habilitation programs, and some participated in classroom activities
directed toward teaching self-proficiency skills, sewing, singing, coloring, and recreational
games. Site observation by Diane S. Kaplan, Aug. 28, 1974. But the habilitation programs
were limited, and most of the waking hours of many patients were spent in rocking
chairs. Keever Interview, supra note 6; Tillman Interview. The major change that the
decree brought these persons was that they previously sat on benches. Report of the
Human Rights Committee for Partlow State School and Hospital (Apr. 2, 1973) (on file
with Yale Law Journal).
The population of Partlow decreased from 1965 residents on Dec. 21, 1971, to 1878
residents on Jan. 18, 1973. Reports of Alabama Mental Health Board, Marable v. Alabama
Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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fringed. 3 4 It did not vest the HRC's with direct responsibility for
implementing the decree. Rather, that responsibility was clearly left
with the defendants, and each HRC was instructed not to interfere
with the administration of the institution.13
The composition of the Partlow Human Rights Committee followed
what might be termed a "commission" model; it was comprised of lay
persons chosen to represent a broad spectrum of the community, and
in this regard was similar to many executive-appointed commissions. 13 6
The PHRC included a minister,13 7 a newspaper editor,13 8 and three
parents of institutionalized, mentally impaired children-one of whom
was in Partlow.13 9 All members of the PHRC had been active in mental
health organizations, or had otherwise demonstrated their concern for
mental health care. 40 However, the committee did not include any
mental health professionals.' 4 ' One post on the Partlow Human Rights
Committee was set aside for a resident, or former resident, of the in-
stitution. 42 The effect of having such a person on the committee can-
not be overemphasized, because of the type of information which an
"insider" is able to provide. For example, when the PHRC was dis-
cussing the use of seclusion rooms to "cool off" unruly residents, the
former resident serving on the committee stated that the major prob-
lem with seclusion rooms was that they contained electrical outlets
134. 344 F. Supp. at 376; Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Heilpern Interview; Keever
Interview; Lorincz Interview; Murphy Interview; Pernell Interview; Tillman Interview;
Wagnon Interview.
135. McCafferty Letter, supra note 79, at 3.
136. See, e.g., NEw YORK STATE SPECIAL COMM'N, ATTIcA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT xxiv-xxv
(1972) (describing the selection of a commission by the Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals, for appointment by the Governor, to investigate the uprising at Attica Cor-
rectional Facility).
137. Rev. Robert Keever, Chaplain, University Presbyterian Church, University of
Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Ala. See 344 F. Supp. at 407. Rev. Keever was succeeded on the
PHRC by Rev. James Pernell, former voluntary chaplain at Partlow, now Reverend of
the Eastern Hills Baptist Church, Tuscaloosa, Ala., Keever Interview, supra note 6;
Pernell Interview.
138. Paul R. Davis, then editor of the Tuscaloosa News, Tuscaloosa, Ala. See 344 F.
Supp. at 407.
139. Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Mathews Interview; Tillman Interview.
140. Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Keever Interview; Lorincz Interview; Mathews
Interview; Pernell Interview; Tillman Interview; Wagnon Interview.
141. Dr. Andrew Lorincz, who was appointed to the PHRC approximately one year
after its inception, is a pediatrician specializing in mental retardation. Lorincz Interview,
supra note 6.
142. This position was first held by Eugene Ward, then a 26-year-old Partlow resident
whose court-ordered diagnosis and evaluation tested his I.Q. at 105. Judge Johnson im-
mediately appointed him as the resident member of the PHRC. Shortly thereafter, Ward
was discharged from the institution. Several months later, the position was filled by
James "Sunshine" Smith, a lifetime resident of Partlow whose I.Q. was also tested at
above mental retardation levels. Shortly thereafter, Smith was discharged from the in-
stitution. However, because he continued to work within the institution, Judge Johnson
granted permission for him to stay on the PHRC. See PHRC Report (July 9, 1973); Till-
man Interview, supra note 6.
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which posed a danger to residents' safety. This point had been over-
looked by the other Partlow Human Rights Committee members. 143
The major shortcoming of the PHRC was that it lacked a full-time
staff to monitor the institution continuously. The committee indicated
awareness of this problem in its request to the court for authorization
to hire full-time salaried "patient advocates," consideration of which
was deferred until appellate review of the case was completed. 144 A
second constraint on the effectiveness of the committee was the absence
of a mental health expert among its members. Although the committee
often called upon consultants for assistance, 145 many members felt
handicapped by the lack of expertise.1 46
The court did not clearly define the powers of the Human Rights
Committees, 47 but instead simply issued instructions that the com-
mittees were to have full access to the institutions and were to report
their findings to the court.148 The committees were not given the
authority to issue subpoenas, to swear witnesses, or to make recom-
mendations to the court,. 49 powers almost always assigned to masters
or receivers appointed by a court to aid in the formulation or im-
plementation of a decree.' 50 This left the committees, at their incep-
tion, to rely primarily on the forcefulness and resourcefulness of their
members.
Although the committees were not formally granted legal powers,
the Partlow Human Rights Committee proved quite effective in
furthering implementation of the decree. In the early stages of im-
plementation, the PHRC, somewhat unsure of its power, used its
authority in several basic ways. First, the PHRC conducted its bi-
weekly meetings like hearings by calling upon institutional staff and
residents to report on violations of the decree. Because the PHRC was
an arm of the federal judiciary, staff members were reluctant to refuse
an "invitation" to appear before the committee.' 5 ' Similarly, although
143. PHRC Report (Aug. 23, 1974).
144. Letter from Judge Johnson to Harriet Tillman, Apr. 18, 1974 (on file with
Yale Law Journal); Letter from Harriet Tillman, Chairperson, PHRC, to Judge Johnson,
Apr. 15, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
145. See, e.g., Roos Progress Report, supra note 74; P. Adams & R. Ollendorff, Report
to the Human Rights Committee for Partlow State School and Hospital (May 21, 1973)
(on file with Yale Law Journal); letter from James D. Clements, M.D., Director of the
Georgia Retardation Center, Atlanta, Ga., to Judge Johnson, June 11, 1973 (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
146. Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Mathews Interview; Pernell Interview; Till-
man Interview; wagnon Interview.
147. 344 F. Supp. at 376.
148. McCafferty Letter, supra note 79.
149. Id.; 344 F. Supp. at 376.
150. See Note, supra note 23, at 106-13.
151. Buckley Interview, supra note 6.
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these persons were not formally sworn as witnesses, they were disin-
clined to lie to the committee, whose reports they knew would be sent
directly to the court.152 Second, by filing its regular reports with the
court, the PHRC elicited from the defendants prompt responses and
continued activity.153 This may have occurred because the defendants
were uncertain about the exact nature of the PHRC's powers, and
thought it ill-advised to ignore PHRC reports and recommendations
to the court. Third, the PHRC made effective use of the press to ex-
pose unconstitutional conditions in the institution and to publicize
changes that were made. This was done largely through the editor of
a local newspaper, who was a member of the PHRC154 and wrote
signed articles about the institution.15
Through this last method, the PHRC developed powers analogous
to executive-appointed commissions, which, as noted, its composition
resembled.15 Commissions rarely have any authority to order changes
in the subject matter of their investigation. Instead, like ombuds-
men,157 they indirectly influence decisionmakers through publicizing
findings and alerting responsible administrators to abuses which must
be corrected. During the early stages of the Wyatt implementation,
when the court maintained a low profile, the PHRC's power was
exercised in a similarly indirect fashion.
In the later stages of implementation, the PHRC began to avail it-
self of the legal powers of the court.'58 When the administration began
to refuse the PHRC access to staff members and files, the committee
obtained an order from the court instructing the defendants to co-
operate.'5 9 This order was supported by the same power of contempt
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Defendants' Response to Order to Show Cause (July 24, 1974) (on file
with Yale Law Journal).
154. See note 138 supra.
155. See, e.g., Davis, Record Funds Okayed for Mental Health Programs, Tuscaloosa
News, Aug. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 8; Davis, Ira DeMent Could Be New Commissioner,
Tuscaloosa News, Oct. 18, 1973, at 6, col. 7.
The chairperson of the Searcy Human Rights Committee has written that the major
contribution of that committee has been in publicizing hospital conditions and bringing
the need for reform to the attention of the public and the state legislature. See Develop-
ments-Civil Commitment, supra note 5, at 1340-41 n.103.
156. See p. 1361 supra.
157. See note 32 supra.
158. Interviews with PHRC members indicated that they never saw the committee as
a body with legal powers. Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Mathews Interview; Tillman
Interview. The committee's use of the court's legal powers was more a result of the
change in how the court responded to reports and requests from the PHRC than of any
change in what the PHRC requested the court to do.
159. Order (Sept. 26, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal). This order was not
specifically requested by the PHRC; the committee simply brought the problem to the
attention of the court, which then issued the order.
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that would be used to enforce a subpoena issued by a traditional master
or receiver. Toward the end of the two year implementation period the
court issued an order 60 requiring the defendants to show cause why
they had not complied with the PHRC's recommendations even though
some of these recommendations were not explicitly covered by the
original decree.16' Thus, the PHRC's continued access to the court
enabled it to rely upon powers similar to those of a master or receiver
responsible for implementation, and to play a role beyond that of
serving as the "eyes and ears" of the court.
2. The Plaintiffs, Amici, and Their Lawyers
The adjudication of structural injunctions generally places heavy
burdens on the lawyers involved in a case, during both the trial and
implementation stages. Judge Johnson recognized this early in the
Wyatt litigation when he ordered the United States, through the
Department of Justice, to enter the suit as amicus curiae, 6 2 and gave
leave to several national mental health organizations to participate
jointly as amici.'68 The United States and the mental health amici as-
sumed some of the burden during the trial and implementation that
might otherwise have fallen on the local counsel who represented the
plaintiffs.
The local counsel who filed the original complaint continued to
represent the plaintiff patients throughout implementation.0 4 At the
beginning of implementation, one of the local attorneys conducted
several of the first PHRC meetings, 65 and contributed to the com-
mittee's aggressive, almost adversarial stance toward the administra-
tion.166 The local counsel remained in close contact with the Partlow
Human Rights Committee, and on the basis of information received
from it, petitioned the court for relief in two specific areas-application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to patient labor, 6 7 and prohibition of
involuntary sterilizations. 68 However, the unsettled question of the
160. Order to Show Cause (June 25, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal); De-
fendants' Response to Order to Show Cause (July 24, 1974) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
161. Compare Third Annual Report, supra note 123, with 344 F. Supp. 387.
162. See 334 F. Supp. at 1343 n.2.
163. Order (A-g.. 20, 1971).
164. Dean, Interview, supra note 6.
165. Dean Interview, supra note 6; Tillman Interview.
166. Tillman Interview, supra note 6.
167. Motion for Specific Enforcement of Prior Orders or in the alternative or con-junctive Motion to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt (July
5, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
168. Amended Complaint or alternatively Motion for Further Relief (July 24, 1973)
(on file with Yale Law Journal).
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right to collect attorneys' fees from the defendants169 constrained the
plaintiffs' lawyers in two ways from continuing an active role in imple-
mentation. Although the district court awarded attorneys' fees, the
funds were impounded pending appeal,170 thereby placing the local
lawyers under a financial strain. In addition, the issue of attorneys'
fees generated animosity between the plaintiffs' lawyers and the de-
fendants. At least one defendant state official went so far as to charge
that the prospect of attorneys' fees was the reason for the filing of
plaintiffs' post-decree motions. 171
The United States, as amicus, performed several distinct roles, some
of considerable value. First, the Justice Department was designated by
the court to provide legal counsel to the Partlow Human Rights Qom-
mittee. 72 Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was able to
provide investigatory assistance to the PHRC,17 3 which enabled the
committee, as an instrument of the court, to present its views to the
district court in a more complete form than otherwise would have been
possible. Finally, the Justice Department also represented the views of
the executive branch of the federal government. In particular, although
implementing the decree never required the court to call upofh the
federal government for assistance, the presence of the United States
as amicus may well have helped to avoid such a crisis. Judge Johnson
had prior experience in utilizing the Justice Department in an amicus
role: he had ordered the United States to participate as amicus in a
school desegregation case. 74 When the state refused to comply with
169. When the Fifth Circuit affirmed Wyatt on the merits, it reserved decision on the
award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs pending decision on the same issue in other cases
before that court. 503 F.2d at 1319.
170. Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychiatric Ass'n, American Psy-
chological Ass'n, American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n, American Civil Liberties Union,
American Ass'n on Mental Deficiency, National Ass'n for Mental Health, and National
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens at 2 (Sept. 20, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Dean
Interview, supra note 6; Drake Interview; Halpern Interview; Humphries Interview.
171. Humphries Interview, supra note 6.
172. Letter from Judge Johnson to Ira DeMent, U.S. Attorney, July 20, 1972 (on file
with Yale Law Journal). In this letter of appointment, Judge Johnson stated:
Since the members of the Human Rights Committees were appointed by this Court,
they are officials of the Court, acting under and by the authority of the Court. For
this reason I do not think it is appropriate that they be represented in the case by
their own counsel or by counsel already appearing for one of the active litigants. It
is appropriate, however, that they be represented by one of the amii, and I hereby
request that you represent the Bryce and Partlow Committees... in any ... matters
where they need legal representation and guidance.
Id. at 1.
173. PHRC Report (Dec. 11, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal); DeMent Interview,
supra note 6; Tillman Interview.
174. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1964);
Order (May 18, 1964) (appointing the U.S. Attorney and John Doar, Attorney, Civil
Rights Div., Dep't of Justice, as amici curiae "to assist the Court in the speedy and just
determination of the issues"), reprinted in 0. FIss, INJUNGrIONS 417 (1972).
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the court's orders, the federal executive branch did not hesitate to step
in.175 Hence, in Wyatt there was no doubt in the minds of the court or
of the parties that the United States would intercede if requested.
The mental health amici performed an active role at the trial stage
in the production of expert testimony and the development of stand-
ards for adequate treatment. However, they did not actively participate
in implementation, but merely remained in contact with the plaintiffs'
lawyers and the Partlow Human Rights Committee.17 6
In sum, despite the assistance provided in specific areas by the law-
yers for the plaintiffs, United States, and mental health amici, the
PHRC bore the primary burden and responsibility for monitoring
implementation and protecting the rights of the plaintiffs. The court
undoubtedly anticipated this when it first appointed the three Human
Rights Committees. However, more active participation by the at-
torneys for the plaintiffs and amici might have compensated for some
of the deficiencies of the Partlow Human Rights Committee that
emerged during the implementation process, especially its lack of
staff. 177 For example, because one of the major shortcomings of the
PHRC was its need to rely on the defendants for much of its informa-
175. See, e.g., United States' Motion for Supplemental Relief (Feb. 7, 1968), Carr v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964), reprinted in 0.
FISS, INJUNCTIONS 459 (1972).
176. Dean Interview, supra note 6; Drake Interview; Halpern Interview; Tillman
Interview.
177. Greater involvement with the PHRC by the attorneys for the plaintiffs or for the
mental health amici would have carried with it the danger that the PHRC would become
more partisan and lose some of its independent status as an arm of the court.
In an order issued several months after affirmance of the case by the Fifth Circuit,
Judge Johnson made clear that he did not want the lawyers for the plaintiffs to become
involved with the Partlow Human Rights Committee:
Insofar as the relationship of the Court, committees, and counsel for the parties is
concerned, it appears that plaintiffs' counsel misapprehend the nature of the role they
play at this stage of the proceedings in this lawsuit. Although it was their responsi-
bility to seek the entry of a judgment and decree which was favorable to the clients
whom they represent and it is their continuing responsibility to protect the interests
of said clients, it is the responsibility of this Court to ensure that its orders are
complied with and its decrees implemented. Whatever function counsel should per-
form in the implementation process is a function whose scope is properly defined
by the Court whose judgment is being implemented or enforced. The role of the
Human Rights Committees in the implementation of the orders in this case and their
relationship with this Court have been the subjects of a number of orders, supra,
letters, and other types of communication and continue to constitute part of the
on-going dialogue which the Court maintains with the committees. If the Human
Rights Committees, or any member thereof, fail in the performance of their func-
tions to reflect the philosophy of the Court insofar as the enforcement and imple-
mentation of the court decrees in this case, then the Court will either reconstitute
the committee(s) or terminate the member(s) whose philosophy and/or actions do
not aid in the Court's implementation and enforcement of its orders. In any event,
this is strictly a court function-not a function of the parties or the counsel.
Order (April 2, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (order did not specify whether
these admonitions were directed to counsel for the mental health amici as well as the
counsel for the plaintiffs).
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tion about what was occurring inside the institutions, the committee
would have been greatly aided by the use of the amici mental health
organizations as experts to conduct thorough, independent investiga-
tions of changes within the institution. Similarly, although a strong
chairperson was able to give some guidance to the PHRC, such expert
advice would have provided the committee with direction and some
sense of priority as to which standards of the decree warranted im-
mediate implementation and which could or should be deferred. How-
ever, the lawyers for the plaintiffs and amici refrained from assuming
an active stance, for they took literally Judge Johnson's statements that
he would not entertain motions for further relief until the case had
been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.17 Furthermore, the lawyers may
have thought that the monitoring of implementation by the PHRC
made their participation less imperative.
3. The Defendants
The defendant state officials were often faced with conflicting
choices and loyalties in the Wyatt implementation. Political considera-
tions caused them to oppose any effort by a federal court to assume
responsibility for the administration of a state institution. Professional
considerations led them to agree with most of the substantive goals of
improved treatment which were ultimately embodied in the decree.
Stonewall B. Stickney, Commissioner of Mental Health when Wyatt
was filed, has written that the Mental Health Board opposed the in-
tervention of the federal judiciary into state mental health programs
and sought vigorously to maintain its own control over the institutions.
However, its agreement with the substantive goals of the decree is
evidenced by the fact that when the Court ordered the parties to sub-
mit proposed minimum standards for adequate treatment, the de-
fendants, plaintiffs, and mental health amici were able to agree on and
stipulate over 90 percent of the required standards.17 9 Moreover, once
the court recognized that a right to treatment existed, Dr. Stickney
began to regard the decree as a method of obtaining increased financial
support from the Governor and state legislature. 80 He saw the court's
178. Dean Interview, supra note 6; Drake Interview; Halpern Interview.
179. Amici's Appeal Brief, supra note 56, at 10. While the defendants stipulated to
most of the standards, they were not sure that they would have the financial resources to
implement them. When Dr. Stickney was asked in an interview whether the stipulations
were entered into in "good faith," he replied, "We had no choice. We were ordered to
come up with standards." Stickney Interview, supra note 6.
180. Stickney Article, supra note 73; cf. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 24, at 59.
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"broad hinting" at judicially ordered financing as a tool he could use
to convince the legislature that it should voluntarily increase its fund-
ing. 81
A similar ambivalence was evident in the Partlow administration.
The Partlow Superintendent alternately regarded the decree as en-
hancing his power and as interfering with his professional judgment. -82
He stated that because the court order placed the authority of the
federal judiciary behind him, he was able to "stand up" to staff mem-
bers, members of the community, and politicians who objected to
actions he took as Superintendent. But he hastened to add that the Part-
low Human Rights Committee as constituted was an encroachment
upon his administrative prerogative. He felt that his administration
was in a better position than the PHRC to protect the rights of resi-
dents, and that a great deal of the progress within the institution would
have been made without the court's decree due to the emphasis placed
on improving Alabama's mental institutions during the administration
of Governor Lurleen B. Wallace. 8 3
The Superintendent's use of the court order to strengthen his hand
in relation to the staff has had some detrimental effects. One of the
major problems in implementation has been resistance to the decree
by both professional and nonprofessional staff members-especially
those who have worked in the institution a long time. These staff mem-
bers have been suffering an "extinction reaction," a perceived loss of
control which they formerly exercised over the residents. By justifying
his actions on the ground that they were compelled by the court decree,
the Superintendent indirectly endorsed the staff's view that the decree
was an intrusion upon the institution and an unjustified limitation on
both the staff's and the administration's authority. As a result of this
"extinction reaction," there have been reports of some personnel be-
coming more abusive to the patients since the issuance of the decree;
moreover, the already strong solidarity among many staff members has
181. Stickney Article, supra note 75; Stickney Interview, supra note 6. In Wyatt, the
agreement between the parties did not come until after the court had held that there
was a constitutional right to treatment and that the three institutions did not meet con-
stitutional standards. The court then ordered the parties to negotiate to develop standards.
Such an agreement, if reached at an earlier stage of the litigation, may in effect make
the lawsuit collusive; moreover, an agreement between the state executive and private
parties, endorsed by the judiciary, to arrogate the state legislature's power to appropriate
funds, would raise serious problems concerning separation of powers. See 503 F.2d at
1317; cf. H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 106
(2d ed. 1973).
182. Buckley Interview, supra note 6.
183. Id.; 344 F. Supp. at 393 n.12. A similar position was taken by Gov. George C.
Wallace on appeal. Brief of Gov. George C. Wallace at 1 (October 1972) (on file with
Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Gov. Wallace].
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increased, producing a "no-ratting" policy whereby many staff mem-
bers do not report incidents that reflect poorly on others.18 4
The Partlow Superintendent would have preferred a differently
constituted body to perform certain aspects of the PHRC's role. In
his view, the only necessary function was the reporting of information
to the court, which could best be done by a committee comprised solely
of mental health professionals who would evaluate data supplied by
the administration.18 5 However, the considerable conflicts and struggles
for information and access that have punctuated the implementation
process suggest that there was a significant need for the independent
monitoring function served by the PHRC.
Governor George C. Wallace, who filed a separate appeal in Wyatt
and filed unsuccessful motions to stay the decree pending appeal, 8 6
had little direct impact on implementation. Although the Governor
declined to honor Judge Johnson's suggestion to call a special session
of the legislature,8 7 he did release eleven million dollars of Alabama's
revenue sharing funds to the Mental Health Board. 88 The Governor's
dual position on appeal-supporting the substantive goals of the decree
while opposing the issuance of the decree and the intervention of the
federal court'8 0-minimized whatever influence he might otherwise
have had on the implementation process. The only apparent effect was
that the Governor's equivocal support of the Wyatt decree permitted
certain individuals within Partlow's administration and staff to deny
the legitimacy of the PHRC and therefore justify their own lack of
co-operation with the committee.
C. General Problems During Implementation
1. Evaluating Compliance With the Decree
A recurring question throughout the implementation process was
whether the court, the Partlow Human Rights Committee, and the
184. Buckley Interview, supra note 6; Scales Interview.
185. Buckley Interview, supra note 6.
186. Motion [of Defendant George C. Wallace] for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal
(May 22, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Order (June 26, 1972) (denying motion)
(on file with Yale Law Journal); Order (Aug. 15, 1972) (U.S. Court of Appeals denying
motion).
187. 344 F. Supp. at 378 n.8.
188. Defendants' Response, supra note 133.
189. The Governor's brief was marked by a self-professed agreement with the
"ultimate achievement of the standards and goals for mental health facilities which are
set forth in the District Court's Order of April 13, 1972," along with a deep disagree-
ment with the role assumed by the court in formulating and implementing the decree.
Brief of Gov. Wallace, supra note 183, at i.
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parties could ascertain the extent to which the institution was in com-
pliance with the decree. The answer to this question depended on ob-
taining accurate information about what was in fact happening in the
institution, and on being able to evaluate those facts against the re-
quirements of the decree.
Obtaining Accurate Information. There were only two basic sources
of information available to the court on what changes occurred in
Partlow during the implementation period-reports filed with the
court by the defendants, and reports prepared by the Partlow Human
Rights Committee. 190 Neither was completely reliable.
The defendants used only the normal bureaucratic institutional
channels to compile information on compliance. Because there was a
self-interest in showing compliance at every level of the institutional
bureaucracy-from ward staff to administrator-the accuracy of the re-
ports was inherently suspect.
While the Human Rights Committees-at Partlow and the other two
institutions-had the independence necessary to ensure an accurate
report, they did not have the resources to do so. Because the Partlow
Human Rights Committee had no staff, it relied primarily on informa-
tion obtained during observation visits made to the institution by
committee members,' 9" and on information from institutional staff
members, patients and patients' families, conveyed both formally at
the PHRC meetings and informally in phone calls.102 These sources
of information were sporadic and incomplete and there was no con-
tinual or internal monitoring system.
In addition to these methods, the Partlow Human Rights Committee
used two other approaches to obtaif information about what was
happening in the institution. The PHRC hired several professional
consultants to advise it about some of the most serious problems re-
maining in the institution. 93 However, while these consultants' re-
ports were comprehensive and impartial, they only covered short
periods of time and therefore did not provide a complete picture of
the changes in the institution after the issuance of the decree. The
190. The PHRC filed reports approximately bi-weekly, after each committee meeting.
As ordered by the court, the defendants filed a progress report after the first six months.
Defendants' Report to the Court Concerning Partlow State School and Hospital (Oct. 10,
1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Annual reports were filed thereafter. See Progress
Report of the Partlow State School and Hospital (June 1, 1973) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
191. Keever Interview, supra note 6; Mathews Interview; Pernell Interview; Tillman
Interview.
192. Tillman Interview, supra note 6.
193. See note 145 supra. Some of these consultants had been called as expert witnesses
during the hearings. See, e.g., Roos Testimony, supra note 56.
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PHRC also utilized the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but with only
limited success, to obtain information about compliance with those
standards that were directed toward protecting residents from physical
abuse, excessive punishment, or unnecessary indignities.194
Therefore, because of the inadequacies of these methods, there
existed no thorough, independently developed data on the extent of
implementation or the level of compliance attained in the institutions
at the time that the Wyatt case was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.19 5
Evaluating the Facts Against the Requirements of the Decree. Even
when accurate facts were obtained, there was an inherent difficulty in
evaluating these facts against the requirements of the decree. This
difficulty resulted in part from the fact that the decree embodied
potentially conflicting goals which represent two divergent mental
health philosophies. One favors a transition from institutionalization
to the "least restrictive alternative" setting for treatment, 96 so that
the only persons who would be institutionalized are those who cannot
receive adequate treatment in a setting which places fewer restrictions
on their liberty. The other proposes a restructuring of the institutions
to make them more humane, but supports maintenance of the basic
institutional framework.
On its face, the decree does not express a preference for either of
these philosophies. Neither the court, the parties nor the amici directly
addressed the question of whether the choice between the two ap-
proaches was a constitutional one, appropriately made by the court, or
a professional one, properly left to the discretion of the state officials. 9 7
194. PHRC Report (Dec. 11, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The FBI in-
vestigation was prompted by complaints received by PHRC members which alleged that
institutional personnel were physically abusing patients. While the FBI did not de-
termine the cause or extent of these abuses, the complaints ceased about the time of the
investigation, and it is possible that the presence of the FBI in the institution deterred
abusive conduct, or, conversely, deterred reports of such conduct. Buckley Interview, supra
note 6; Tillman Interview. At the behest of the Justice Department, the FBI was utilized
at Bryce and Searcy Hospitals to obtain information on changes in those institutions
since the issuance of the decree. Instead of developing independent data, the FBI relied
almost exclusively on information supplied to them by the hospital administrations. In-
terview with Diane Dorfman, Attorney, Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice, in Mont-
gomery, Ala., Aug. 29, 1974.
195. Supplementary Report of Amicus Curiae United States of America at 3 (Sept. 20,
1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
196. See Chambers, Right to the Least Restrictive Alternative Setting for Treatment,
in 2 P.L.I., LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 91 (B. Ennis, P. Friedman & B.
Gitlin eds. 1973).
197. The most important legal difference between the two philosophies, and the key
to whether the choice is a constitutional or a professional one, is the manner in which
they relate to the constitutional basis of the right to treatment-that the due process
clause requires treatment as the quid pro quo for involuntary commitment. See note 2
supra. The philosophy which favors institutional reform maintains that institutionaliza-
tion can meet due process standards as long as adequate treatment is provided. The
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The failure of the court to resolve this issue made it difficult to
evaluate whether overall institutional changes furthered long-range
compliance with the decree. For example, virtually all of the expendi-
tures made to comply with the decree were directed toward improving
treatment within the existing institutions.19 8 Reports filed with the
court and extensive interviews have provided no indication that the
defendants ever considered the alternative of abandoning the institu-
tions entirely and devising other methods of providing adequate treat-
ment, such as small, community treatment centers which might provide
more effective care at a lower cost and with a lesser deprivation of
liberty.199 While the capital expenditures made in the institutions
were not great enough to foreclose a possible long-range goal of de-
institutionalization,20 0 the effect was to generate momentum toward
institutional reform rather than deinstitutionalization. Hence, if it is
later held that deinstitutionalization to the least restrictive alternative
is constitutionally compelled, the changes made in the institutions will
not have advanced the state mental health system toward that goal.
Beyond this inherent ambiguity in the court's order, there existed
further difficulty in assessing compliance with the judicial mandate.
Most of the individual standards of the decree could be objectively
quantified, and compliance with the specific requirements was simple
to evaluate on a standard-by-standard basis. For example, compliance
with standards which established staffing ratios for the professional and
nonprofessional staff, maximum numbers of residents allowed to be
housed in a ward, and specifications for the renovation of buildings,
philosophy which endorses a transition to the least restrictive alternative setting for
treatment argues that institutionalization can only meet due process standards if no less
drastic intrusion on the patient's liberty can provide adequate treatment. Cf. Covington v.
Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum).
198. Defendants' Response, supra note 133; Buckley Interview, supra note 6. The
counsel for the Mental Health Board stated in an interview that the Board would not
release capital funds for noninstitutional facilities until ordered to do so by the court.
Humphries Interview.
199. Dean Interview, supra note 6; Dinsmore Interview; Keever Interview; Tillman
Interview. Cf. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, Civil No. 72-356, 357
(E.D.N.Y., Apr. 30, 1975) (consent decree), which provides for virtually complete deinstitu-
tionalization of mental patients in New York's Willowbrook Development Center. Willow-
brook, which contained more than 5,000 patients before this litigation began, will have
its patient population reduced to 250. The consent decree would set up 200 community
places for patients in the first year-hostels, halfway homes, workshops, and day-care
training centers. Most community centers would be limited to 25 resident patients. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
200. In the three fiscal years covered by the decree to date, ending 1972 through
1974, $1,280,451.40 was spent on capital improvements at Partlow-primarily to eliminate
fire hazards, partition bathrooms, and install air-conditioning. In comparison, the annual
operational expenses of Partlow were: 1971-72, $8.8 million; 1972-73, $13.2 million; and
1973-74, $15.4 million. Defendants' Response, supra note 133, at 6.
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can usually be evaluated without any subjective judgment.20 How-
ever, it became much more difficult to evaluate compliance when one
considered the interaction of the various standards and the cumula-
tive impact of the changes made in the institution. For example, the
parties generally recognized that probably the most important of the
standards was the requirement that the institution develop individual-
ized habilitation programs for the residents. As one member of the
Bryce Human Rights Committee stated, "Individual habilitation plans
are the keystone to successfully implementing the substance of the
decree because everything that is to be done to and for a patient is
determined by these plans." 20 2 Therefore, if one evaluated compliance
with a given standard, such as staffing ratios in a particular ward, with-
out considering whether the residents had individualized habilitation
plans, the evaluation would be distorted. It would neglect to consider
that even though the staffing ratios might have been improved, one
could not be sure without the individualized habilitation plans that
the staff knew the specific needs of each resident, or that the increase
in the number of staff improved the care of the residents.
The ability of the Partlow Human Rights Committee, and therefore
of the court, to evaluate compliance ultimately depended upon its
understanding of the interrelation among the standards, the potential
detrimental and beneficial effects of selective compliance, and the
long-range implications of stopgap measures. While the PHRC was
able to measure compliance on a standard-by-standard basis, its ability
to determine the full impact of the changes was limited because few
committee members possessed the expertise necessary to gain the
requisite understanding.20 3
2. The Need for Continuing Judicial Superivision
Ascertaining the Scope of the Decree. When the Wyatt decree was
issued it was viewed as comprehensive by all parties. However, as im-
plementation progressed, serious problems about the scope of the
decree arose over two issues: whether the decree protected the rights
of residents after their discharge from the institutions, and what would
201. However, even compliance with a mathematical standard like a staffing ratio may
sometime be deceptive. Jack Drake, co-counsel for the plaintiffs, commented, "Statistics
lie because there is a large number of professionals doing administrative work; not caring
for patients. Patient-staff ratios arc therefore of questionable value." Drake Interview,
supra note 6.
202. Wagnon Interview, supra note 6.
203. Mathews Interview, supra note 6; Pernell Interview; Tillman Interview; Wagnon
Interview.
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be done if abuses not contemplated in the original complaint or the
decree were uncovered in the course of implementation.
Because some PHRC members became concerned that certain for-
mer residents had not been properly placed outside the institution
but instead were "dumped" into the community,20 4 the Partlow
Human Rights Committee raised the question of whether the decree,
and the committee's responsibility, extended to residents who had been
discharged from the institution.20 5 In response to a PHRC request for
clarification of its responsibility, the district court explicitly restricted
the committee to the institution.2 6
Because the PHRC was the only method the court had to supervise
the decree, this restriction effectively limited the scope of the decree to
the institution's walls. Yet it was clear that problems existed with
residents released from the institution. Storekeepers in local com-
munities complained of former residents engaging in such conduct as
urinating on the floors, opening up and using packages of make-up,
and bouncing on beds in furniture stores.20 7 Discharged residents al-
legedly engaged in improper sexual behavior, leading to complaints
and criminal charges. 205 Citizens of one town in Alabama applied for
and were granted a state court injunction to close a halfway house for
residents discharged from one of the Wyatt institutions, alleging that
the house was so badly supervised that it constituted a nuisance which
devalued local property. 20 The lack of adequate post-institutional
placement and followup was also evidenced by complaints received by
the Alabama Mental Health Board from local mental heath organiza-
tions, which stated that Partlow residents had been inappropriately
204. Tillman Interview, supra note 6; Wagnon Interview.
205. Tillman Interview, supra note 6. See note 93 supra.
206. Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Mathews Interview; Tillman Interview;
Wagnon Interview. But see note 221 infra.
207. Wagnon Interview, supra note 6.
208. PHRC Report (Feb. 4, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal); PHRC Report
(Mar. 16, 1974). One severely retarded resident who was released into the community was
arrested and charged with child molesting. PHRC Report (Apr. 16, 1973) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). At his competency hearing, the former Partlow resident was com-
mitted by the local court back to Partlow "until such time as he is found to be competent
to stand trial." Alabama v. Wigley, No. 3587-B (6th Jud. Cir. Ct., Ala., Apr. 15, 1974)
(on file with Yale Law Journal). The patient had been advised by Partlow staff members
that he had the alternative of standing trial and probably going to jail, or returning to
Partlow. Not wanting to go back to Partlow, and having had placement in a halfway
house foreclosed, the resident said that he preferred jail. Nevertheless, because he was
deemed incompetent to stand trial, he was committed to Partlow. Memorandum from
James Allen, Social Director of Partlow State School and Hospital, to Dr. Richard
Buckley, Superintendent, Apr. 2, 1974.
209. Bankston v. Smith, No. 32,015 (23d Jud. Cir. Ct., Ala., Mar. 5, 1974) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, and the
state Mental Health Board entered the case as amicus in support of the defendants.
Humphries Interview, supra note 6.
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placed under their care in facilities that were not suited to meet those
persons' needs.2 10
The district court's decision to limit the PHRG's jurisdiction to the
institution was probably founded on well-intentioned beliefs that the
problems should be attacked one at a time. However, the court ap-
parently failed to anticipate that the decree itself would create prob-
lems outside the institution, through the discharge of residents, and
thus did not take sufficient measures to minimize these effects. Further-
more, the decree's constitutional standards for adequate institutional
treatment arguably applied to residents of the institution who were
released. Discharged patients should be considered members of the class
entitled to a right to treatment until they successfully reenter the com-
munity and all of the possibly adverse effects of institutionalization
have been removed. 211
A similar problem regarding the scope of the decree arose when
outside scrutiny of the institution uncovered abuses not contemplated
by the court in its order. For example, a disparity in the treatment of
the races in the institution was suggested by the fact that a dispropor-
tionately large number of deaths occurred among black Partlow resi-
dents, when compared to the deaths in the resident white popula-
tion.212 However, it was impossible to determine the reason for this
due to the lack of accurate records on individual residents, and there-
fore no action was taken by the PHRC, the plaintiffs' attorneys, or the
court. Nevertheless, the incident underscores the possibility of dis-
covering abuses not encompassed by the decree which require correc-
tive action by the court.
Unanticipated Effects of Enforcement. Because the Wyatt decree
required massive institutional restructuring, it created the possibility
that changes undertaken at one stage of implementation would have
adverse effects at another stage. Problems of this nature ranged from
administrative oversight of routine matters, to at least one serious error.
210. Letter from Jeff Caskey, Associate Director, Southwest Alabama Health Planning
Council, to Charles Aderholt, Commissioner of Mental Health, July 31, 1973 (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
211. See standard 47, 344 F. Supp. at 407. The reason for this is that the due process
obligation of the state to provide patients with a "realistic opportunity to be cured," 325
F. Supp. at 784, is not fulfilled if the patient is returned to the community without
adequate provision for the transition to normal community life.
212. PHRC Report (June 23, 1973); Lorincz Interview, supra note 6. The Wyatt
decree did have one effect on race relations in the institutions. Dr. Stickney stated that
implementation of the district court's earlier decree in Marable v. Alabama Mental Health
Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1971), which ordered Alabama to desegregate its mental
institutions, was furthered by the increased scrutiny of the institutions due to the Wyatt
case. Stickney Interview, supra note 6.
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The routine problems may well be a necessary concomitant of in-
stitutional change. For example, toilet facilities at Partlow were in-
stalled on the basis of the patient population before patients were
moved from one part of the institution to another, with the result that
after the moves many of the residents were without appropriate toilet
facilities.2 13 Similarly, large numbers of untrained staff members were
hired under the court order, with inadequate provision made for their
training. This required experienced staff to take time from their
normal jobs to instruct the new personnel, thereby temporarily reduc-
ing the level of care provided.2 14
A more serious problem emerged eirly in the implementation
process. The court's decree required the institution to compensate
patients for institution-maintaining labor. Shortly after the decree was
entered, the Partlow Human Rights Committee began to note numer-
ous complaints from patients who had been working without compen-
sation before the issuance of the decree but who, after the issuance of
the decree, were no longer allowed to work215 because the administra-
tion allegedly lacked the resources to pay them. 210 "These residents
are now bored and anxious to be doing something," the PHRC
noted.2 17 This problem had not been foreseen by the court. It was
eventually corrected by clarifying the decree to allow patients to per-
form uncompensated labor for therapeutic purposes.218 This incident
illustrates the need for continuing judicial supervision to deal with the
unanticipated effects of implementation.
3. The Informal "'Stay" Pending Appeal
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit declined formally to
stay the district court's decree during the two year pendency of the
213. Tillman Interview, supra note 6.
214. Stickney Interview, supra note 6.
215. PHRC Report (June 9, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
216. Id. Standard 33 of the Partlow decree, 344 F. Supp. at 402-03, incorporated
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1966), which forbids un-
compensated patient labor.
217. PHRC Report (June 9, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
218. Order (Dec. 4, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal). This order was issucd in
response to Motion for Specific Enforcement of Prior Orders, or in the alternative or
conjunctive Motion to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt
(July 5, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Ironically, the motion, filed by the law-
yers for the plaintiff patients, emphasized the fact that those patients who continued to
work were not compensated, while the PHRC had stressed that large numbers of patients
were no longer allowed to work. Compare Motion for Specific Enforcement of Prior
Orders, or in the alternative or conjunctive, Motion to Show Cause Why Defendants
Should Not Be Held in Contempt (July 5, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal) with
PHRC Report (June 9, 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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appeal.2 19 However, political considerations dictated that the district
court exercise restraint until its decision was affirmed. Therefore,
Judge Johnson let it be known220 that he would take no additional
steps to enforce the decree, either through judicially ordered financ-
ing, the appointment of a master, the expansion of the PHRC's power,
or the use of the court's contempt powers, until the court of appeals
approved his initial orders establishing both the right to treatment and
the appropriate standards for implementing that right.221 Thus, there
was effectively an informal, partial "stay" of the district court's decree.
As a result of Judge Johnson's position, little pressure was placed on
the defendants to comply promptly with the court's order, and imple-
mentation therefore proceeded slowly during this period. One possible
benefit of this delay was that it allowed the defendants a "grace
period," thereby decreasing the friction inherent in a decree ordering
institutional change.222 However, the delay in implementation was
219. See note 186 supra.
220. Tillman Interview, supra note 6; Wagnon Interview.
221. However, shortly after affirmance by the Fifth Circuit, Judge Johnson issued
two orders, apparently to correct some of the problems that had emerged during the
pendency of the appeal. First, Judge Johnson authorized each of the three Human
Rights Committees to employ one full-time "staff specialist," e.g., a psychiatrist, to be
responsible to the committee and to the court. Order (Feb. 7, 1975) (on file with Yale
Law Journal). The salary of each specialist was to be paid by the Department of Mental
Health. Id. Each committee was also authorized to employ a full-time secretary, and was
given office space on the premises of the institution. Id. Second, upon Motion of the
Partlow Human Rights Committee (Dec. 23, 1974) the court extended the jurisdiction
of the PHRC beyond Partlow's walls to "any other centers, homes, and facilities-public
or private-to which retarded persons are assigned or transferred for residence by the
Alabama Department of Mental Health." It similarly extended the jurisdiction of the
Bryce Human Rights Committee to other institutions for the mentally ill. Order (Feb.
28, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Cf. pp. 1358, 1360 supra. However, this
recent modification does not grant either of the Human Rights Committees authority to
protect the rights of patients who are discharged from the institutions into the com-
munity.
222. Another potential benefit is that during this delay the Fifth Circuit could have
observed what was actually happening in the institution, thereby avoiding having to
answer in the abstract the question of the feasibility of the decree. However, the Fifth
Circuit did not do this. The only action taken by the appellate court to serve this pur-
pose was the issuance of an order on August 20, 1974, two and one-half months before
its opinion was issued, which requested information on the current state of the institu-
tions. Order (Aug. 20, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The order, which took the
form of a "questionnaire," requested information from the parties and amici on several
specific matters-the number of professional and nonprofessional staff employed in each
institution, the current number of patients in the institutions, and changes in the in-
stitutions' budgets. The order also requested information on what legal actions, if any,
had been taken by the district court since the issuance of the decree. The Fifth Circuit
did not request to see copies of the Human Rights Committees' reports, which had been
filed in the district court and which contained the most reliable information on the
progress of implementation.
The mental health amici objected to this procedure, stating that it was necessary to
develop the facts fully in evidentiary hearings on compliance in the district court. Sup-
plemental Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 170, at 3-4 (Sept. 20, 1974). However, it is
common practice for appellate courts to ascertain informally from counsel what, if any,
facts have changed since the lower court record was completed. In cases decided promptly,
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widely regarded by members of the Human Rights Committees, 223 and
attorneys for the plaintiffs22 4 as frustrating the purposes of the decree.
Because the two year "stay" substantially impeded the implementation
process in Wyatt, courts ought to consider carefully the effect that a
protracted delay in decision will have on their ultimate ability to
render appropriate relief.
Conclusion
Experience in implementing the Wyatt decree during the two year
pendency of the appeal has underlined the importance of continued
judicial responsibility for the implementation of decrees requiring in-
stitutional change. It has also highlighted some of the problems en-
countered in this process and some of the limits on a court's power to
reform institutions. During these two years, substantial improvements
have occurred in Partlow which have made it safer, more sanitary, and
generally more habitable for the residents. But a large disparity still
exists between the existing institution and the standards contained in
the decree.
Judge Johnson clearly recognized both the need for continued
judicial responsibility and the usefulness of a judicially fashioned
body-the Human Rights Committee-to assist the court in its task.
The Partlow Human Rights Committee served as the "eyes and ears"
of the court by monitoring changes in the institution, reporting on
these changes, and recommending to the court alternative approaches
to implementation.
The PHRC proved to be an effective aid to the court's retention of
jurisdiction. The committee's continued access to the court, and its
ability to publicize its findings, enabled it to influence the defendants
this usually takes place at oral argument and covers changes that occurred between the
entry of the lower court judgment and the date of oral argument. See, e.g., DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1974); Transcript of Oral Argument in DeFunis v.
Odegaard, reprinted in 3 DEFUNIS VERSUS ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
1327, 1330 (A. Ginger ed. 1974). Nevertheless, because the factual requests in Vyatt went
beyond this informal inquiry, it would have been desirable for the Fifth Circuit to in-
struct the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on compliance to supplement
the record already in the appellate court. Such a procedure would have served the goal
of basing the decision on the current facts of the controversy, and avoided the danger
of relying on representations by one party that had not been subject to an adversarial
hearing. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit would have been well-advised to request the district
court to provide it with periodic progress reports on changes in the institution pursuant
to the decree during the pendency of the appeal. This would have enabled it to appraise
the changes more accurately, and therefore better assess the feasibility of the decree.
223. Dinsmore Interview, supra note 6; Mathews Interview; Murphy Interview;
Wagnon Interview.
224. Dean Interview, supra note 6; Drake Interview.
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toward implementation. The vagueness of the committee's powers al-
lowed the court to vary its authority according to changing circum-
stances. There was a substantial correlation between the PHRC's ef-
fectiveness in bringing about improvements in the institution and the
willingness of the court to support the efforts of the committee through,
for example, the issuance of a show cause order. The committee's ef-
fectiveness was limited by its lack of staff, which precluded continual
monitoring of the institution; its want of expertise, which made
thorough evaluation of the changes difficult; and the resistance of the
institutional bureaucracy to outside scrutiny.
The variance which still remains between the standards of the decree
and the conditions within the institution results primarily from two
factors. First, during the protracted delay in the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion, a "go slow" approach was adopted by the district court. This al-
lowed the defendants to proceed at their own pace in implementing the
decree, and discouraged the plaintiffs and amici from insisting on
prompt compliance. Second, although state expenditures for mental
health have increased enormously, Alabama has yet to make the mas-
sive financial commitment required to implement the decree fully.
Moreover, the failure of the court or the parties to confront whether
the "right to treatment" compels deinstitutionalization and treatment
in the least restrictive alternative setting, rather than only institutional
reform, has limited implementation to the latter.
Wyatt has shown that the judiciary is capable of achieving fairly
broad reforms in existing institutions. However, the implementation
of the decree in Wyatt provokes important questions of both a legal
and practical nature. The propriety of issuing this type of order de-
pends upon one's view of the proper relationship between the judicial
branch and the legislative and executive branches. The efficacy of
these orders is ultimately determined by the ability of courts to formu-
late and enforce such relief. Because Wyatt is only a single case with
many unique features, and because its first phase of implementation
was restricted by the pendency of an appeal, Wyatt cannot conclusively
resolve either of these questions on the separation of powers or the
institutional competency of the judiciary. Further study by both judges
and scholars is thus necessary to provide more definite conclusions
about the process of implementation. In rendering decisions, courts
rely on legal precedents established in other cases involving analogous
issues. In effectuating those decisions, courts should similarly be able
to rely on practical precedents concerning the implementation of
judicial decrees.
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